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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
The extraordinary source of energy that is contained within the nuclear fission 
chain reaction can solve energy crises across the globe in the form of nuclear power. 
Unfortunately, for the same scientific reasons, nuclear fission poses a serious global 
threat in the form of nuclear weapons. The U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower gave 
the renowned “Atoms for Peace” (AFP) speech in 1953 to address the “fearful atomic 
dilemma” [1] we faced after World War II and in the d velopment of the Cold War. 
Within his address, he stated that we must “find the way by which the miraculous 
inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.” This 
speech subsequently led to the AFP program which lad the groundwork for the nuclear 
nonproliferation agreements we have today [2].  
The AFP address called for an international body to regulate fissile material and 
nuclear technologies, while promoting peaceful use of fissile material through safe 
nuclear technologies including nuclear power production. As a result, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was founded in 1957. By 1970, the Treaty on the 
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was entered into force with the objective to 
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and their technology, while encouraging the 
peaceful use of nuclear technology [3]. Through the NPT, today’s nuclear safeguards 
system was established. Nuclear safeguards are define  as the effort to prevent diversion 
of fissile material. Such endeavors are the responsibility of the IAEA and are supported 
by diplomatic and economic means. 
Given the growing complexity of nuclear facilities and current proliferation 
threats across the world, new technologies are needed to maintain successful international 
safeguards efforts. Specifically, technologies thatcan aid direct, fast, and robust detection 
of fissile material diversion are crucial to this effort. Additionally, safeguards designed 




1.1. Description of the Problem 
At nuclear facilities, domestically and internationally, many measurement systems 
used for nuclear materials’ control and accountability rely on helium-3 (3He) detectors. 
These systems depend on well-established relationships to interpret multiplicity-type 
measurements for verifying quantities of special nuclear material (SNM). SNM is defined 
by Title I of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium 
enriched in isotopes uranium-233 or uranium-235. 3He is ideal for neutron detection and 
has found its way into many areas of nuclear material control and accountability. This 
rare-earth isotope is primarily produced through the decay of tritium involved in nuclear 
weapons production. Throughout the Cold War and for almost two decades afterwards 
3He was viewed as waste, sold at a low rate, and thus not conserved [4]. For these 
reasons, a serious resource shortage has arisen, and alternatives to 3He systems are 
urgently needed. Additionally, in the near term, the cost of current 3He-based systems 
continues to increase as the supply cannot meet the demand.  
This mission also presents the opportunity to broaden the capabilities of such 
measurement systems to improve current multiplicity techniques. With long dead times 
associated with neutron thermalization necessary in 3He systems and the detector 
electronics, measuring advanced nuclear fuels and spent nuclear fuels with high fission 
rates can be a challenge. A system that operates faster has the potential to solve this 
problem. Development of advanced nuclear safeguards systems can solve current 
resource shortage problems and expand the scope of such systems to encompass a 
broader range of SNM. 
1.2. Significance of This Work 
The primary goal of this work is to design an advanced nuclear safeguards 
measurement system in the form of a fast-neutron-multiplicity counter (FNMC) with 
organic-liquid scintillators to quantify fissile material mass. With the excellent timing 
properties of liquid scintillators in conjunction with excellent neutron/photon pulse-shape 
discrimination (PSD), a multiplicity system is being designed that can perform 
characterization within reasonable uncertainty on gram levels of plutonium in short times. 
Such a system will also be less prone to detection/haracterization errors for high-activity 
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nuclear materials. Due to the direct measurement of fast neutrons from fission, 
supplementary quantities related to the fission neutron’s energy can also be utilized. Also, 
an organic-liquid scintillation multiplicity system can make use of photon and joint 
neutron/photon multiplicities to solve for additional unknowns.  
The tools present within the Detection for Nuclear Nonproliferation Group 
(DNNG) for this multi-disciplinary design effort include: state-of-the-art neutron/photon 
PSD techniques, advances in digital data-acquisition systems, and novel data-processing 
systems and techniques. The efforts were focused on designing a passive low-plutonium-
mass characterization system. When designing a neutron-multiplicity counter (NMC) 
there are a number of standard goals that need to be kept in mind. First of all, the system 
efficiency must be sufficient enough to measure not only neutron singles and doubles, but 
also triples. For traditional 3He systems, 40-60 % absolute neutron-counting effici ncy is 
a common range to aim for [5], while many systems have efficiencies on the order of 10-
30% [6]. Similarly, another goal is minimizing electronic dead-time losses and detector 
die-away times in order to maintain an efficient system [5]. A fast neutron multiplicity 
system with fast liquid scintillation detectors is inherently advantageous regarding these 
two issues. 
Next, to develop a system that can quantify plutonium mass in a wide array of 
material types and composition, it is important that the efficiency is consistent across a 
reasonable range of neutron energies [5]. Neutrons are particularly interesting as the 
number of neutrons emitted strongly depends on the decay type. Neutrons emitted from 
SNM are the result of spontaneous and induced fission events, which have quite similar 
neutron-energy distributions. Neutrons are also emitt d from alpha-n events (α, n) which 
can vary significantly in neutron-energy emission. Lastly, the material matrix will self-
attenuate emitted neutrons and alter the neutron energy distribution, based on the matrix’s 
neutron scattering cross section. A fast-neutron system does not require optimized 
moderation for neutrons across a wide range of energies, which is an additional benefit. 
Liquid scintillation detectors are conveniently consistent over the range of most neutron 
energies from fission and (α, n) neutrons. 
Throughout this work, efforts are made to present the vast capabilities of liquid 
scintillators. Research pursuits were concentrated on simulation and experimental studies 
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of various types of nuclear material with a focus on plutonium-containing samples. 
Investigations include efficiency studies, neutron energy spectroscopy, passive and active 
coincidence detection, and neutron multiplicity. Results portray the potential for liquid 
scintillator measurement systems to characterize SNM. This work concludes with the 
development of a FNMC prototype and preliminary measurement results from a variety 
of plutonium samples. 
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Chapter 2. Radiation Detection Instrumentation 
2.1. Current Nuclear Safeguards Instrumentation 
The implementation of nuclear safeguards in nuclear facilities depends on a 
multidisciplinary set of equipment. Many types of nuclear safeguards instrumentation 
exist, including: physical seals, video surveillance, and laser range finders. Information 
and data from each of these sources is compiled during facility inspections and is used to 
draw conclusions on compliancy with safeguards protocols and verification of facility 
declarations. The type of instrumentation studied in this work relies on radiation 
detection. Such instrumentation is designed to characte ize SNM by detecting radiation 
emission from radioactive decay and spontaneous fission. 
The most standard form of safeguards confirms or disproves the presence and 
type of materials from a facility’s declarations. The technologies used to verify the 
material declarations include both destructive and nondestructive assay. Nondestructive 
assay is a preferred method of investigation and can include technologies based on 
neutron, photon, or calorimetric measurements.  
Photon measurements are convenient considering radioactive decay of key 
isotopes in SNM emit mono-energetic characteristic photons. Many photon detectors are 
available that directly measure these characteristic photons into individual, completely 
resolved photopeaks [7]. Figure 2-1 shows a measured photon spectrum for uranium 
isotopes. By counting the abundance of detections in certain photopeaks, masses can be 
determined, and by using ratios of counts within these key photopeaks, enrichment 
information can be determined. The downside of photon measurements lies in the high 
probability of material self-shielding. Knowledge gained from such photon spectroscopy 
is applicable to only the outer layers of the nuclear material (this is on the order of a 
couple of cm for the least dense uranium materials and a fraction of a cm for uranium 
metals [8]). Additionally, photons have a high presence in background radiation which 




Fig. 2-1. Photon spectroscopy for natural uranium (0.72% 235U enrichment) and 90% 235U-
enriched uranium [8] [9]. 
Calorimetric instrumentation measures heat emitted from the absorption of alpha 
particles in SNM. Alpha decay is probable with uranium and plutonium isotopes and the 
stopping distance for alpha particles is on the order of micrometers. The specific power 
of each nuclide is unique and by measuring the total power (heat) created, with 
knowledge of a sample’s isotopic composition its mass can be quantified. Of all non-
destructive material assay techniques used in safegu rds, calorimetry is the most accurate 
and precise, considering the matrix of the material does not affect the transmission of the 
signal in the same way it does for photons and for neutrons. However, calorimetry 
requires long measurement times (on the order of 4-8 hours) and is not contained in a 
portable geometry and thus is not practical for most safeguards inspection scenarios [10]. 
All of these mentioned concepts have positive and negative attributes, but neutron 
measurements remain to be a leading method.  
2.2. Neutron Detection 
Neutrons are more penetrating than other forms of radiation and are less prevalent 
in radiation background and naturally occurring radio ctive materials. Basic neutron 
counting is utilized in many nuclear nonproliferation applications, such as portal 
monitors, as neutron detection systems are less susceptible to false alarms caused by 
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background and few commonly traded goods emit neutrons. An added benefit of neutron 
measurements exists due to the emission of multiple neutrons spontaneously from a 
single reaction, which is unique to fission. Neutron-multiplicity distributions are 
characteristic of specific fissile isotopes. Therefo , neutron-multiplicity measurements, 
where the neutron multiplicity distributions are measured, have continued to rise to the 
top for characterizing fissile materials in nuclear accountancy applications.  
2.3. 3He Neutron Detection 
Current neutron detecting field instrumentation utilized in domestic and 
international nuclear safeguards relies on 3He detectors. Neutron detectors containing 3He
have a high efficiency for neutron detection via neutron capture when neutrons are 
moderated to thermal energies. Well established theory to analyze the signals (neutron 
coincidence or multiplicity) that come from systems containing many 3He detectors can 
provide values such as the mass of SNM. 
2.4. Neutron-Multiplicity Counting 
Early characterization systems measured only the neutron rate, which was 
applicable to only a few types of plutonium containing materials, considering there are 
other neutron emitting reactions present in many plutonium containing materials. Further 
developments extended systems into neutron coincidee counters, which provided a 
method to isolate only the measurement of neutrons from fission and has been 
extensively applied in safeguards. With the measurement of the neutron fission rate and 
knowledge of the neutron-multiplicity distribution, the mass of certain plutonium 
isotopes can be identified.  
Neutron coincidence counting has not been as applicable to domestic 
accountability considering that only two parameters are measured (singles and doubles) 
and therefore the system’s neutron detection efficincy must be known. For impure 
plutonium samples, the neutron detection efficiency of the system may change and 
become a variable due to large amounts of neutron scattering or moderation within the 
sample. To solve this problem, assumptions must be made regarding the amount of (α, n) 
neutrons or the sample multiplicity. For greater accuracy and the minimization of 
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assumptions, neutron-multiplicity systems were developed that provide three measured 
parameters: singles, doubles, and triples. With a neutron-multiplicity system, the goal is 
to be able to correctly characterize any nuclear fuel cycle material without any 
knowledge of the material’s matrix. [5] 
Currently available multiplicity systems are categorized based on the range of 
plutonium mass they are designed to quantify. For lower masses of plutonium (0.1 to 500 
g of plutonium) low-level inventory sample coincidenc  counters are available from 
companies like Canberra. High-level systems measure up to several kilograms of 
plutonium. Both low and high level systems contain just fewer than twenty 3He tubes. 
These systems rely on spontaneous fission from the ev n numbered isotopes of 
plutonium. Similar systems, such as active-well coin idence counters, can quantify 
uranium as well, but require a neutron active-interrogation source and more than twice as 
many 3He tubes. Other systems are designed to measure specific nuclear fuels such as 
neutron coincidence collars (PWR, BWR, CANDU assemblies), fast breeder reactor 
subassembly counters (single or groups of fast breeder fuel pins), and plutonium scrap 
counters (impure plutonium samples or mixed-oxide fu ls). A FNMC described and 
discussed in this report is applicable for all of these measurement scenarios [6]. 
A common method for identifying correlated events is through shift-register 
circuits based on the concept of a Rossi-alpha distribution [5]. The Rossi-alpha 
distribution, shown in Fig. 2-2, is the time distribution of events that occur after a 
randomly chosen start event. This distribution will be uniform with time if only 
uncorrelated events are detected; therefore it will have features when correlated events 
are present. The distribution is defined by the consta t uncorrelated events plus the 
exponentially decaying “Reals” events. Time gates ar  then defined to isolate the “Reals 
+ Accidentals” portion and the “Accidentals” portion of the distribution. The “Reals + 
Accidentals” gate will be on the order of tens of microseconds, and then there will be a 
long delay (on the order of thousands of micro-seconds) before the “Accidentals” gate is 
opened for a time more similar to the initial gate [5]. An actual measured distribution will 
not increase exponentially as you take the limit to zero, due to pulse pile-up and 
electronic dead-time effects [5]. Therefore, a “pre-delay” time gate is also specified to 




Fig. 2-2. A Rossi-alpha distribution showing the time-dependent neutron detections after an 
arbitrary start event. The “Reals” are shown as “R” and the “Accidentals” as “A”. The 
predelay gate, prompt and delayed gates, and long delay gate are defined by “P”, “G”, and 
“D” respectively [8]. 
Identification of only the “Reals” leads to the indcation of the multiplicity 
distribution and furthermore the fission rate, which s necessary to eventually determine 
the plutonium mass [5]. Specialized electronics exist to take the mentioned stream of 
pulses and isolate the mentioned time-gates to identify the neutron-multiplicity 
distributions for both the “Reals + Accidentals” and “Accidentals” gates [5]. The result of 
analyzing and unfolding both sets of data is the singles, doubles, and triples values 
needed for eventual mass quantification [5]. A FNMC can directly provide these three 
parameters without the circuitry and unfolding. 
2.5. Organic Scintillators 
Organic liquid scintillators are not traditionally used in the nuclear safeguards 
field due a variety of reasons. These detectors are ensitive to both neutrons and photons 
and have reasonable efficiency over the energy range of interest (500 keV to 10 MeV) for 
fission neutron detection [7]. Additionally, organic scintillators and photo-multiplier 
tubes (needed to correctly amplify the light created in the scintillator) have fast response 
times (within 1 ns) which are good for SNM characterization applications. The neutron 
absorption cross section for 3He rivals all other neutron interaction cross sections that are 
easily accessible for neutron detectors; therefore it previously was not necessary to 
innovate measurements systems utilizing new neutron detectors. Additionally, organic 
scintillators had insufficient photon discrimination, challenging toxicity, and low 
flashpoint in some cases.  
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Detector developments have improved the fieldability of liquid scintillators by 
raising their flash-point temperature. Technological developments in digital data 
acquisition electronics has allowed more detailed data analysis and improved neutron and 
photon discrimination. In today’s world with the rising need for novel nuclear safeguards 
instrumentation, organic scintillation detectors are  promising candidate for innovative 
neutron measurement systems. The remainder of this work will study organic scintillators 




Chapter 3. MCNPX-PoliMi and MPPost Instrumentation Modeling 
Research and development in the area of nuclear safegu rds instrumentation often 
requires the use of simulation tools. Testing of potential SNM characterization 
instrumentation components (radiation detectors) and data analysis techniques is difficult, 
expensive, and sometimes practically impossible due to the sensitivity of the materials 
that must be measured. Therefore, having a sound simulation package that can accurately 
replicate instrumentation response is paramount. Through detailed testing and validation I 
have found MCNPX-PoliMi [11] (a Monte Carlo code) and MPPost [12] (an MCNPX-
PoliMi post-processing code) to be essential in liquid-organic-scintillator instrumentation 
research and development. 
3.1. MCNPX-PoliMi 
Many Monte Carlo simulations of nuclear processes utilize interaction physics in 
conjunction with stochastic particle transport. Examples are the MCNP codes. However, 
MCNP does not correctly incorporate the correlated particle detection required in several 
SNM-characterization applications. MCNPX-PoliMi is a modified version of the 
MCNPX code developed in order to obtain time-correlated quantities – specifically the 
correlation between neutron interactions and their consequent photon production. 
MCNPX-PoliMi utilizes a unique event-by-event modeling technique that uses analog 
physics to simulate physical reality in a correct manner. 
The use of organic scintillation detectors were investigated with MCNPX-PoliMi 
and MPPost for several nuclear safeguards applications [13]. Both MCNPX-PoliMi and 
MPPost are available through the Radiation Safety Information Computation Center at 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory [11]. The design process to develop nuclear safeguards 
instrumentation is further expedited with the UM parallelized version of MCNPX-PoliMi 
coupled with UM advanced computing resources. 
MCNPX-PoliMi is an ideal tool for designing neutron detection systems 
(specifically regarding neutron multiplicity) due to its: capability of realistically 
12 
 
simulating correlated source events, detailed particle interaction output, and availability 
of SNM sources with accurately sampled energy, number of particles emitted, and 
angular distributions. MCNPX-PoliMi incorporates the ability of simulating all standard 
MCNP sources with additional custom sources. These nov l sources (commonly found in 
SNM) include spontaneous-fission distributions with specific multiplicity distributions 
for 238U, 238Pu, 240Pu, 242Pu, 242Cm, and 244Cm. Additionally, (α, n) distributions are 
source options for samples involving plutonium isotopes in oxides: 238Pu, 239Pu, 240Pu, 
and 241Am [11]. 
It is important that the physics of particle emission (specifically fission) are 
accurate when modeling coincidence/multiplicity measurements [13]. MCNPX-PoliMi 
incorporates neutron and photon multiplicity distribut ons with correlated neutron and 
photon production [11]. After the production of allsource particles, detailed interaction 
information on an event-by event basis is recorded within all volumes of interest 
(typically detectors). This detailed information is then processed to develop detector and 
measurement system response. 
3.2. MPPost: An MCPX-PoliMi Post-Processing Code 
MPPost (an MCNPX-PoliMi post-processing code) processes the MCNPX-
PoliMi data file into both individual detector and total system design responses. MPPost 
requires the data output file from MCNPX-PoliMi and the definition of various detector 
and measurement system parameters. For an organic liquid scintillation detector system, 
some of these parameters include: energy deposition to light-output conversion functions, 
detector pulse generation time, detection threshold, dead-times, and coincidence time 
windows. The measured relationship for neutron energy deposition (Ep in MeV) and 
detector light output (LO in MeVee) is given in Eq. 3-1 with a, b, c, and d ependent on 
the detector type [14]. 
     	 
         (3-1) 
For the liquids used throughout this work, values are shown in Table 3-1. MPPost 
uses the above LO relationship to create “pulse heights” in the detector. For example, to 
create a single neutron pulse, the energy deposition for each neutron interaction is 
converted to light using Eqn. 3-1, and all the light created within the given pulse 
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generation time (pulse rise time) (~10 ns for the liquid scintillators) is summed up into a 
single light pulse. If the amount of light is above th  specified keVee threshold and below 
the upper limit of the data acquisition then the pulse is accepted and tallied towards 
various requested outputs. The order of scattering events on hydrogen (H) and carbon (C) 
within the organic material (H-H-C or H-C-H for example) affect the amount of light 
collected in each pulse because neutron interactions on carbon transfer less energy and 
emit a very small amount of light; for this reason MCNPX-PoliMi’s event-by-event 
simulation methodology is important for accurate pulse reproduction.  Outputs from 
MPPost include pulse-height distributions (PHDs), correlated particle analysis such as 
time-of-flight (TOF) and cross-correlation functions (CCFs), and neutron and photon 
multiplicities. The neutron multiplicity algorithm takes into account data acquisition dead 
times and gives results for multiples measured within a specified time window. 
Table 3-1.  Five parameters for the measured exponetial relationship between neutron 
energy deposited on hydrogen and light output for two cylindrical EJ-309s owned by the 
DNNG. 
 a b c d 
7.62 cm ø x 7.62 cm 0.81723 2.6290 -0.29686 1 
12.7 cm ø x 12.7 cm 0.74787 2.4077 -0.29866 1 
3.3. MPPost Software Testing and Validation 
It is important to use measurements to verify the validity of the Monte Carlo 
simulation methodology. Simulations are a key component in the development of 
radiation detection measurement systems; agreement b tween the measured and 
simulated results builds confidence in the ability to develop such systems in this 
particular manner. 
Throughout all studies included within this work, the simulation tools helped 
better design and understand measurement systems and results. After each measurement 
investigation, simulations were performed to replicate all of the details of the 
measurements and comparisons of the results were und rtaken. Many comparisons are 
made including PHDs to help verify the built-in source energy distributions and the 
energy to LO relationships. CCFs are compared to test the accuracy of the simulated 
correlated timing and reconstruction of pulses. Lastly, multiplicity measurement 
validation assures correct modeling of fissile isotope energy-dependent-multiplicity 
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distributions [13]. Throughout all of the validation efforts described in this work, 
feedback was continuously provided for the development of the latest MCNPX-PoliMi 
release and the overall development of the MPPost code to improve the end product. 
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Chapter 4. Organic Scintillator Response 
Organic scintillation detectors are being increasingly used in systems that are 
developed to simultaneously measure neutrons and photons from fissile materials. These 
detectors function at an appropriate range of energy for neutron detection within this 
application (the typical neutron-energy range for this work is between 500 keV and 10 
MeV), allowing fast-neutron detection with nanosecond accuracy. In addition to neutron 
detection, organic scintillators are sensitive to ph tons, providing an additional source of 
information. Furthermore, liquid scintillators offer the capability to utilize PSD 
processing techniques on measured data, providing an accurate method for distinguishing 
between neutrons and photons [15]. This dual mode of detection makes organic 
scintillators useful for applications requiring the d tection and/or characterization of 
SNM. 
4.1. Detection Mechanisms 
4.1.1. Neutron Interactions 
Neutron interactions in materials are dictated by their energy-dependent 
interaction cross sections. Neutrons partake in twodifferent types of interactions: 
scattering and capture. When a neutron elastically scatters on a nucleus, the energy and 
direction of the neutron changes and the target nucleus recoils with transferred kinetic 
energy, but the nucleus is unchanged with regards to it  proton and neutron count. With 
neutron capture, the target nucleus in fact changes, and a number of different types of 
radiation can be emitted as a result: examples include protons, alpha particles, multiple 
neutrons, and fission neutrons and photons [8]. 
Elastic scattering is the primary neutron detection mechanism in organic 
scintillators. In elastic-scattering events, the total kinetic energy of the incident neutron is 
divided between the target nucleus and the scattered neutron. On average, the fraction of 
the incident neutron energy (f) that is transferred to the target nucleus is defined in Eqn. 
16 
 
4-1 where A is the target nuclei’s atomic weight: 0.5 for hydrogen and 0.14 for carbon. 
This relationship illustrates that a low-A medium will quickly decrease an incident 
neutron’s energy in a few interactions [8]. 
      ⁄          (4-1) 
4.1.2. Photon Interactions 
Three major types of photon reactions take place in matter: photoelectric 
absorption, Compton scattering, and pair production [7]. The dominance of the three 
interaction types is shown in Fig. 4-1, where Compton scattering is the dominant 
interaction for mid-range photon energies (0.5 to 10 MeV) across all absorption mediums 
and for all photon energies with low-atomic numbers (low-Z). Compton scattering is a 
photon interaction where an incident photon scatters on an electron, transfers a portion of 
its energy to the electron (always less than its full energy), and travels in an altered 
direction with its remaining energy. 
 
Fig. 4-1. The relevant dominance of the three primary photon interactions with relation to 
the atomic number (Z) of the absorber and the photon energy in MeV [7]. 
The low-Z material of organic hydrocarbon scintillaors has a high cross section 
for elastic scattering of neutrons across all energies, shown in Fig. 4-2a. Compton 
scattering is the prominent photon interaction for SNM emitted photons in such a low-Z 
material, with little photoelectric effect present. Proton and electron recoil lead to the 
excitation and light emission that is collected and converted into an electronic pulse. 
Scattering events in the scintillator occur within nanoseconds and the majority of the light 
is collected within a single waveform. A good choice for standard liquid scintillators is 
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Eljen Technology’s EJ-309 (H5C4) [16] as these liquids have been manufactured to have 
a higher flash point than older liquids while preserving light emission.  
 
       (a)                                                                      (b) 
Fig. 4-2. a) The neutron elastic-scattering cross sections on a linear scale as a function of the 
neutron energy for two isotopes [8]: 1H, 12C , which dictate the scattering signal in organic 
scintillators. b) The neutron-absorption cross section on a logarithmic scale as a function of 
the neutron energy for 10B that is doped into organic scintillation detectors to provide 
capture-gated detection. 
Some detectors are based on organic scintillators with added components that 
yield high neutron-capture properties. These so called capture-gated detectors are 
operated in a dual-pulse mode, resulting in the same general information as from standard 
liquids (using only neutron-scatter events) with adde  neutron spectroscopy information 
(when also using neutron-capture events). An incoming neutron will undergo multiple 
scattering events on the hydrogen and carbon present in the scintillation material; after 
the neutron has lost most of its energy a capture will occur. Therefore, two signals are 
typically detected for each fully absorbed neutron: the initial scattering pulse and the 
subsequent capture pulse. A graphic example of this dual-pulse scheme is displayed in 
Fig. 4-3. The time between the two pulses depends o the geometry and composition of 
the detector but is typically on the order of several hundreds of nanoseconds. The 
amplitude of the scattering pulse is strongly correlated to the incident-neutron energy. 





Fig. 4-3. A depiction of the dual-pulse detection scheme used to visualize the neutron energy 
spectrum measured by a boron-loaded liquid scintillator. 
Figure 4-2a shows the neutron-scattering cross sections for the hydrogen and 
carbon that are present in organic scintillators, allowing detection in organic detectors 
and supplying the initial signal in capture-gated detectors. Figure 4-2b provides the 10B 
neutron-capture cross section. In the BC-523A detector, the neutron-capture on 10B 
results in an alpha particle that generates the neutron-capture pulses as shown in Eq. 4-1. 
In addition to the alpha particle, a high-energy capture photon is often (approximately 
94% of the time) coincidentally detected with the charged particle. Also, 7Li ions 
contribute to the detected capture pulse. 
       !"#$ %       (4-1) 
4.2. Digital Data Acquisition 
DNNG measurement systems include commercially availble waveform digitizers 
paired with custom data-acquisition software. Acquiring digital data allows detailed and 
accurate data analysis, including sub-nanosecond timing and advanced neutron/photon 
PSD techniques. It has been found that 12-bit vertical resolution (11-bit effective) and 
250 MHz sampling frequency is sufficient to pick uppulse-shape differences that are 
typically present between the neutron and photon interactions in a liquid scintillator [18]. 
Digital data acquisition allows a plethora of offline data analysis algorithms and 
their development. Initial data analysis includes cleaning of the digitized liquid 
scintillator data to remove pile-up and saturation. Examples of good pulses are shown in 
Fig. 4-4. In order to remove saturation, pulses are removed that do not peak within the 
digitizer’s dynamic range of 2 V. All four detectors are gain-matched using a 137Cs 
photon source. Fig. 4-5 shows the Compton continuum for the 137Cs 662 keV mono-
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energetic photons. The 2-V upper level limit will fa l at varying LO values depending on 
the detector gain. For the settings involved in Fig. 4-5, the upper limit falls at 1.91 
MeVee which equates to approximately 6-MeV neutron-energy deposition. Next, the 
removal of pulse pile up is an important step considering the results have an effect on 
PSD performance [18]. An incremental data point fraction is used (with 0.2 as the 
fraction) to identify waveforms that contain double pulses, where an incremental data 
point increases beyond the specified fraction of the first pulse’s height. Photon rejection 
is the next step, using a PSD method described in Sect. 4.3 [15]. After PSD, many forms 
of data analysis are performed including pulse-height analysis, cross-correlation 
functions, and multiplicity. 
 
Fig. 4-4.  Examples of accepted waveforms from a liquid scintillation detector with pulse 
widths on the order of 10 ns and full data acquisiton windows of 400 ns. 
Capture-gated detectors are treated very similarly when it comes to data 
acquisition. Neutron scatter and neutron capture events generally occur with enough time 
between pulses (due to the moderation of the fast neu ron in the detector) that the dual-
pulse mode can be acquired in two digitized waveforms by triggering on both pulses 
individually. Waveforms are cleaned and PSD is performed. Accepted scattering and 





Fig. 4-5. Measured 137Cs Compton continua for four gain-matched EJ-309 det ctors. 
4.3. Neutron and Photon Discrimination 
The PSD method that is used throughout this work has been established in the 
past and is based on a standard charge-integration method [15]. Specifically, two 
integrals are calculated for each measured pulse: an integral of the pulse tail and an 
integral of the total pulse (Fig. 4-6).  The two range-optimized integrals allow the 
calculation of a ratio to accurately distinguish the interacting particle type.  
 
Fig. 4-6. Optimized integrals for a standard charge-integration PSD method for organic 
liquid scintillators. 

























Figure 4-7 shows the relationship between the two mentioned integrals where the 
separation between neutrons and photons is given by the discrimination line. Neutrons 
have more light in the tail of their pulses due to the mass of the recoil proton as opposed 
to the recoil electron involved in a photon event. The performance of the PSD algorithm 
varies as a function of pulse height [19] (with poorer performance at lower pulse heights). 
Figure 4-8 demonstrates the quality of the PSD at various pulse-height ranges where 
better PSD corresponds to better separation between th  eutron and photon distributions. 
Future Chapters show this PSD distribution for a variety of nuclear materials including 
plutonium metal and plutonium-oxide. 
 
Fig. 4-7. Tail integrals versus total integrals with the neutron/photon discrimination line for 
a bare 252Cf measurement with a 7.62 cm ø by 7.62 cm EJ-309 liquid scintillator. 
3He detectors used in safeguards today have ensured the ability to reject photon 
detection. Therefore, the PSD algorithm is one of the most crucial data analysis steps to 
justify the use of organic scintillators for neutron detection. SNM often emits far more 
photons than neutrons and therefore the effect of misclassification on neutron detection 
data analysis can be significant. As a general rule, we expect a photon misclassification 
rate on the order of 1/1000 over all pulse heights wi h a 70 keVee threshold. This is a 




Fig. 4-8. The ratio of the tail-to-total integrals for various ranges of pulse heights from a 
bare 252Cf measurement with a 7.62 cm ø by 7.62 cm liquid scintillator. 
 
Fig. 4-9. The relationship between the tail integral and total integral of a set a pulses 
detected with the BC-523A detector measurement of one of the MOX samples through 5 cm 
of lead shielding. 
In addition to standard liquid scintillators, capture-gated organic scintillators also 
benefit from PSD algorithms. Specifically in boron-loaded liquid scintillators, PSD is 
used to classify each detected event as a photon scattering event, neutron scattering event, 
or a neutron-capture event (generally marked by an alpha pulse). The PSD method is 
similar to the method used for the standard liquid scintillator data. The presence of 10B in 
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the BC-523A liquid allows for neutron capture in the scintillation material. The neutron 
capture results in an alpha particle which is then stopped in the organic material, 
providing a pulse that has a longer decay time thane neutron and photon pulses (due to 
the greater mass of the alpha particle). This different pulse-shape results in a third region 
when visualized on the tail versus total integral plot shown in Fig. 4-9. 
4.4. Detector Efficiency 
The intrinsic efficiency of neutron and photon radiation detectors is an important 
parameter for the development of new nuclear nonprolife ation techniques. For many 
detectors commonly used in the area of nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear safeguards, 
this information is also crucial for the accurate characterization of the properties of 
nuclear materials. Although many of these detectors provide similar information on the 
neutron and photon fields, their detection efficieny is not always consistent, especially 
as a function of energy. The efficiency for each detector may differ based on various 
factors in its detection mechanisms. Accurate knowledge of the detection efficiencies for 
various detectors can help to choose the detector type that best suits the given application. 
Intrinsic efficiency describes the relationship betw en the number of pulses that 
are detected and the number of radiation quanta that are incident on the detector, as 
defined in Equation 4-2 [7]. This parameter provides a method of comparison that is 
dependent on the detector’s material and geometry, on the data-acquisition system, and 
on the incident radiation energy. Furthermore, knowi g the efficiency of a detector lends 
the ability to determine the absolute activity of a source. 
&'()  *+,-./ 01 2+34.4 /.50/6.6*+,-./ 01 /7687980* :+7*97 8*586.*9 0* 6.9.590/    (4-2) 
As discussed previously within this Chapter, organic scintillators boast many 
positive attributes for use in measurement systems to characterize fissile material. Within 
the category of organic scintillators, liquid scintilla ors provide the most tools to be 
successful in nuclear safeguards applications. Another organic detector type is the 
capture-gated organic scintillator which adds additional neutron energy spectroscopy 
abilities. The detection efficiencies of both types of detectors rely on neutron elastic 
scattering in the organic material. For capture-gated events, the efficiency also is greatly 
affected by the probability of subsequent neutron capture in the detector. The following 
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results focus on neutron detection efficiency. Conveniently, energy dependent neutron 
detection efficiency can be thoroughly investigated in the simulation realm. 
4.4.1. Simulated Neutron Efficiency 
Three DNNG detectors were modeled to determine their intrinsic neutron 
scattering efficiencies. Two cylindrical standard liquid scintillation detectors (EJ-309) 
were modeled: 7.62 cm diameter (ø) by 7.62 cm depth and 12.7 cm ø by 12.7 cm depth. 
One cylindrical capture-gated detector, a boron-loaded liquid scintillator (BC-523A), was 
modeled: 12.7 cm ø by 12.7 cm depth. The material compositions for the standard liquid 
and the boron-loaded liquids are outlined in Tables 4-1 and 4-2.  







Liquid Scintillator 1H 55.5 
 C 44.5 







Liquid Scintillator 1H 55.8 
 C 32.1 
 O 9.1 
 10B 2.7 
 11B 0.3 
Each simulation consisted of a mono-energetic, mono-directional, surface source 
of either neutrons or gamma rays of various energies, impinging perpendicularly on the 
front face of the detector where each particle immediat ly enters the active volume. The 
radius of the source matches the radius of the detectors. MPPost was used to create pulses 
and simulate each detector’s response. Neutron-scattering signals were considered only 
when exceeding the applied LO threshold which was varied between 10 and 100 keVee. 
The relationship between the energy deposited by neutrons and the scintillator’s LO is 
exponential, as discussed in Sect. 3.2. The capture p lses are considered ideal (it is 
assumed each capture event creates a measurable pulse). This assumption was made due 




In capture-gated detectors there are two separate intrinsic neutron efficiencies that 
are studied: neutron-scattering efficiency and neutron-capture-gated efficiency. Scattering 
efficiency characterizes the sensitivity of the organic liquid or plastic scintillator, while 
the neutron-capture-gated efficiency characterizes th  neutron absorbing material – 10B. 
The neutron-capture-gated efficiency describes the det ctor’s overall ability to collect 
full-energy spectroscopic information. Standard liquid scintillators will only produce 
scatter pulses, as they do not contain any materials with high neutron absorption cross 
sections. Figure 4-10 shows the energy-dependent neutro -scattering detection efficiency 
for both the 7.62 cm ø by 7.62 cm and 12.7 cm ø by 12.7 cm EJ-309 detectors. Figure 4-
11 shows the scattering detection efficiency and the neutron-capture-gated efficiency of 
the 12.7 cm ø by 12.7 cm BC-523A detector operated with a 50 keVee threshold (highest 
possible threshold to detect the capture events). 
 
Fig. 4-10. The simulated energy-dependent neutron-scattering efficiency of the 7.62 cm ø by 
7.62 cm (left) and 12.7 cm ø by 12.7 cm (right) EJ-309 detectors for various LO thresholds.  
For all of the curves shown in the maximum efficieny can generally be found 
between the threshold and 2 MeV, which conveniently aligns with the most probable 
energy region for neutrons emitted from fission. As the threshold increases, the intrinsic 
efficiency decreases. Therefore, choosing a threshold is a compromise between neutron 
detection efficiency and photon misclassification as discussed in Sect. 4.3. Many features 
in the carbon-neutron-scattering cross section (Fig. 4-2) are only visible when the 




Fig. 4-11. The simulated energy-dependent neutron-scattering efficiency and neutron-
capture-gated efficiency for the 12.7 cm ø by 12.7 cm BC-523A detector. 
Figure 4-12a relates the depth (in the direction of the incident radiation field) of 
the two EJ-309 detectors (diameters of 7.62 cm and 12.7 cm) to the intrinsic neutron-
scattering efficiency of 2-MeV incident neutrons. No large gains in efficiency result in 
detectors greater than ~10 cm. This is expected considering the mean free path of a 2-
MeV neutron in the EJ-309 material is approximately 4 cm, the neutron will lose most of 
its energy in the first collision, and there are three to four neutron collisions per accepted 
pulse on average for these two detectors. Figure 4-12b relates the depth of the BC-523A 
detector (12.7 cm ø) to the intrinsic neutron-scattering efficiency and capture-gated 
efficiency of 2-MeV incident neutrons. 
  
Fig. 4-12. a) Intrinsic neutron-scattering efficiency with a 70-keVee threshold as a function 
of the length of two EJ-309 detectors for 2-MeV neutrons and b) neutron-scattering 
efficiency and capture-gated efficiency with a 50-keVee threshold as a function of the length 
of the BC-523A detector for 2-MeV neutrons. 
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4.4.2. Measured Neutron Efficiency 
Measuring energy-dependent neutron-detection efficincy is not a trivial task 
considering there are no radioisotope sources that naturally emit mono-energetic 
neutrons. Therefore, techniques can be used to isolate individual neutron energies such as 
using accelerators to induce nuclear reactions and/or using TOF measurements to identify 
the energy of a measured neutron from a continuous s rce [20]. A basic method for 
measuring efficiency that has been used by the DNNG includes TOF and a 252Cf source: 
triggering on a fission event in the start detector, using TOF in stop detector (the detector 
under investigation) to label the neutron’s energy, tallying the detection of neutrons in the 
stop detector as a function of energy, and then determining the detector’s energy-
dependent efficiency based on knowledge of neutron emission from 252Cf. Fig. 4-13 
shows the measured results for the 7.62 cm ø by 7.62 cm and the 12.7 cm ø by 12.7 cm 
detectors with 50 keVee thresholds, the setup is detailed in [14]. 
 
Fig. 4-13. Measured intrinsic-neutron-detection efficiency for two EJ-309 detectors 
measured with a 252Cf source. 
4.5. Neutron Energy Spectroscopy 
The ability to acquire the neutron energy distribution for a given fissile source is a 
much sought after commodity. Current neutron detection technologies for nuclear 
nonproliferation applications use thermal neutron capture as the main detection 
mechanism, specifically with 3He-gas tubes. These technologies are highly efficient and 
robust, but are incapable of providing in-depth information about the nuclear material’s 
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neutron energy distribution. Organic scintillators have the potential to provide 
spectroscopic information as the amplitude of the PSD-attributed neutron pulses is related 
to the deposited neutron energy. Moderation is not necessary for detection in organic 
scintillators; therefore the deposited neutron energy is more closely related to the energy 
of the neutron emitted from the source. 
Mixed-oxide (MOX) samples were measured at Idaho Nation l Laboratory (INL) 
and the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra, Italy. Details regarding these measurement 
campaigns are described in detail in future Chapters.  MOX has significant amounts of 
the isotope 240Pu which is notable for its high spontaneous fission activity; as a result, 
passive measurements are possible. Additionally, due to the presence of oxygen with 
plutonium, (α, n) neutrons are emitted as a consequence of plutonium-isotope alpha 
decay, followed by alpha-particle capture on oxygen, with neutron emission as the result. 
Measurement results show that the use of liquid organic scintillators enables the user to 
distinguish pure fission sources, such as 252Cf and plutonium metal, from plutonium-
oxide sources (such as MOX fuel), and (α, n) sources (such as Am-Be) based on their 
neutron energy spectra [21]. 
4.5.1. Pulse-Height Distributions 
To gain an understanding of the energy distribution of eutrons emitted from the 
measured nuclear materials, the shapes of PHDs are studied. The neutron energy 
distribution is of interest in nuclear safeguards as it can help characterize the type of 
neutron emitting material being measured. Methods used for quantifying mass, such as 
neutron multiplicity, often need to be calibrated based on the type of plutonium-
containing material that is measured. Although PHDs do not give detailed information, 
the general shape of the PHD could contribute to this task.  
After cleaning the digitized data, the pulse heights of all PSD-attributed neutrons 
and photons over the measurement threshold are histogrammed into keVee bins 
(commonly 10 keVee). Figure 4-14 shows an example of neutron and photon PHDs from 
the measurement of MOX fuel pins. Characteristic mono-energetic photons are emitted 
from the MOX samples and represent the significant amount of radioactive decay taking 
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place in the sample. Specific photon energies from abundant decays in the MOX samples 
will show their presence in the photon PHD as Comptn edges. 
 
Fig. 4-14. Measured neutron and photon pulse-height distributions of a MOX sample 
measured at INL. 
The Fig. 4-14 photon PHD shows three edges that are likely from the 241Pu 
photons at 375 and 414 keV together, the 137Cs fission fragment at 662 keV, and the 
common 1460 keV background photon from 40K. The maximum Compton scattering 
energy deposition (the Compton edge) can be calculated using Eq. 4-3 where E equals the 
energy of the incident photon. 
;<=>?@=ABCD   EF>GHFI E      (4-3) 
Considering that neutron scatter deposits a uniform distribution of energies from 
zero to its incident energy, PHDs from continuous energy sources are expected to be 
quite featureless, as seen in Fig. 4-14. Despite the lack of detail, the PHDs still carry 
useful information regarding trends in the incident neutron energy distribution [21]. 
Figure 4-15 shows a normalized comparison of PHDs measured from a variety of neutron 




Fig. 4-15. Measured neutron pulse-height distributions (normalized to their integral) for 
252Cf, plutonium metal, an Am-Be source, four MOX samples, and a set of PuO2 pellets. 
The shapes of the PHDs approximately follow the averag  energy of the measured 
neutron energy distributions. The PHDs in Fig. 4-15 clearly provide the ability to 
distinguish between different categories of sources: (α, n) neutrons from Am-Be, fission 
neutrons from 252Cf and plutonium-metal, and a combination of fission and (α, n) 
neutrons from MOX and PuO2. Figure 4-16 displays the simulated neutron energy 
spectra, through 5 cm of lead, and incident on the det ctor face for a number of sources 
measured at the INL and JRC facilities. For comparison, a few measured average neutron 
pulse heights and simulated average neutron energies for the nuclear materials measured 
in Fig. 4-15 are shown in Table 4-3.  
 
Fig. 4-16. Simulated neutron energy distributions, tallied on the detector faces through the 5 
cm of lead shielding, for the seven neutron sources studied in this work. 
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The EJ-309 PHDs showed clear identification capabilities between different 
categories of neutron sources. This proves that organic scintillation detectors can provide 
identification of sources based on neutron energy information. Techniques such as 
neutron-energy-spectrum unfolding have the potential to uncover more information about 
the neutron-energy distribution. 
Table 4-3. Average measured pulse heights and simulated average incident neutron energies 
for select sources. 
Sample 
Average Measured 
Pulse Height (MeVee) 
Average Incident 
Neutron Energy (MeV) 
INL MOX  0.29 1.91 
JRC MOX 0.29 1.95 
252Cf 0.30 2.08 
Am-Be 0.49 3.70 
4.5.2. Neutron-Energy-Spectrum Unfolding 
Spectrum unfolding can be used on organic scintillator PHDs to obtain 
estimations of incident neutron energy spectra. As mentioned previously, the amplitude 
of neutron pulses is related to the deposited neutron energy. Despite this relationship, 
when using organic scintillation detectors, the resulting PHDs require the use of 
unfolding techniques to obtain the incident neutron e ergy information. MCNPX-
PoliMi/MPPost is used to accurately model the neutron source from materials such as 
MOX, and provide the neutron energy distribution for c mparison to the experimental 
estimations. Additionally, the simulation package can be used to develop the organic 
scintillator’s three-dimensional detector response a  a function of incident-neutron energy 
and the LO response. 
Two varieties of MOX at the JRC were measured, which are composed of various 
uranium, plutonium, and oxygen isotopes, leading to neutron emission from spontaneous 
fission, induced fission, and (α, n) reactions. The plutonium-metal samples’ neutron 
emission is exclusively from the spontaneous fission of 240Pu. The Am-Be provides a 
unique spectrum from (α, n) reactions that allows good comparison to the rest. Figure 4-
16 includes the shapes of the neutron energy distributions for the discussed sources. 
Figure 4-17 shows the measurement set up and its simulated counterpart including four 
12.7 cm ø by 12.7 cm EJ-309 detectors, with 5 cm of lead shielding, and located 30 cm 




Fig. 4-17. Four EJ-309 liquid scintillators surrounding a 1-kg MOX sample with 30 cm 
spacing from the center of the source to each of the detector faces. 5 cm of lead shielding is 
present in front of each detector. MCNPX-PoliMi was used to simulate the measurement 
configuration. 
The estimation of neutron energy spectra, specifically through unfolding methods 
that involve the solution of inverse problems, requires detailed knowledge of the 
detector’s response for individual neutron energies incident on the detector. This response 
is packaged into a matrix that is obtained through a series of simulations. This routine can 
be easily repeated and allow comparison of neutron spectrum estimation for a variety of 
organic scintillation detectors. 
Neutron-spectrum unfolding is a process that includes solving an inverse problem 
in order to acquire the incident neutron energy from the combination of the measured 
result and a detailed detector response. This problem is outlined in Eq. 4-4, where we are 
solving for Φ(En). The response matrix, R, is a function of the measured LO, L, and 
single neutron energy, En. The count-rate density N is what is measured and is only a 
function of L. The response matrix must be formed for a particular detector in advance. 
As previously described, simulations were used to acquire the response matrix for this 
study. 
       (4-4) 
The solution to direct inversion of this problem is ill-conditioned. Thus, inversion 
can result in nonphysical results and has a great sensitivity to statistical uncertainty in the 
measurements or errors that develop during the measur ment process (noise for 
example). Therefore, in this unfolding example, a sequential least-squares method is used 
[22]. At each iterative step (solution approaching the estimated spectrum), a quadratic 
sub-problem is solved with realistic boundaries. The subsequent solutions are still 
JJJJ  K JJJJJJ, JJJJJJJJJJJJJJ 
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considered to be rough estimations as they strongly rely on uncertainties in both the 
detector response matrix and the measurement itself. 
Figure 4-18 displays the simulated detector response matrix that was used to 
develop the estimated neutron energy spectra shown in this work. With the knowledge of 
the amount of LO that is produced by neutron interactions in a hydrocarbon scintillator 
(such as EJ-309), we can simulate PHDs for various mono-energetic neutron beams 
incident on the detector. After running a wide range of simulations, each of the resulting 
PHDs can be combined into an overall detector response. If the LO dimension were to be 
collapsed, the result would be an efficiency curve as shown in Sect. 4.4. The estimated 
neutron energy spectra appear to be greatly sensitive to the accuracy of this response, 
thus accurate simulation of detector response is crucial. 
 
Fig. 4-18.  MCNPX-PoliMi simulated detector response for an EJ-309 liquid scintillator with 
a 12.7 cm ø and 12.7 cm depth. 
It was determined that measured neutron PHDs provided the capacity to clearly 
distinguish between different source categories, such as purely fissile sources or those 
that also involve neutron emission from (α, n) reactions. Although, more detail of the 
neutron energy spectrum is desired. Therefore, efforts have turned towards unfolding 
neutron energy spectra estimations from PHDs. 
Figure 4-19a shows the simulated neutron energy distributions of the neutrons 
incident upon the four liquid detectors, through the 5 cm of lead shielding, displayed in a 
course binning scheme. The 252Cf and the plutonium-metal simulations depict the 
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expected fission Watt spectra. The two MOX sources are very similar to each other in 
their combination of the Watt spectra from spontaneous and induced fission reactions 
plus the additional knee contributed by neutrons that are a result of (α, n) reactions. The 
Am-Be source, as expected, provides a broad distinct shape that is vastly different from 
the other measured sources. 
 
Fig. 4-19.  a) Simulated neutron energy distributions, tallied on the detector faces with a 
large binning scheme that matches the current limitations of the unfolding method and b) 
spectrum unfolding results obtained from measured PHDs for the five neutron sources of 
interest. 
Figure 4-19b shows a comparison of the unfolded measur d PHDs for all five 
sources. The same conclusions can be drawn from Fig. 4-19b as for the measured PHDs: 
characterization of neutron sources into various categories. Therefore, it can be said that 
neutron spectrum unfolding with this particular algorithm and parameters does not 
provide an advantage over the study of basic PHDs alone. 
An improvement in unfolding results is seen when inputting a “simulated” 
neutron PHD into the algorithm, as shown in Fig. 4-20. This can be considered as a limit 
to the unfolding abilities with this specific algorithm and its configuration, which 
revolves around a simulated detector response matrix. 
The estimation of neutron energy spectra, through unfolding did not provide 
results that would give an advantage over studying differences portrayed in the PHDs 
alone. This work did provide a good starting point with much room for improvement in 
the data analysis algorithm designed to perform spectrum unfolding. One of the largest 
areas for improvement is in the development of the accurate detector response matrix. 
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Improved knowledge of the energy deposited to LO relationship and optimization of the 
binning scheme used in the detector response matrix had a significant impact on the 
unfolded results in subsequent efforts. Additionally, expanding the investigation to novel 
organic detectors promises to provide much insight into the task of accurately measuring 
neutron energy spectra. 
 
Fig. 4-20.  The unfolded simulated PHD of a MOX sample compared to the simulated 
neutron energy distribution. 
Potential spectroscopy in organic scintillators provides yet another tool that these 
detectors bring to the table for nuclear nonproliferation and safeguards applications. 
Additional pieces of information only solidify thes detectors as good candidate for 
advanced system design. 
4.5.3. Capture-Gated Spectroscopy 
Additional spectroscopy information is available in organic scintillators that 
combine neutron-capture capabilities with their usual neutron scatter mechanisms: 
“capture-gated detectors”. Such detectors can be analyzed utilizing a dual-pulse detection 
scheme as discussed in Sect. 4.2. This work focuses on the neutron spectroscopic abilities 
of a boron-loaded liquid scintillator (BC-523A [17]) in comparison to a standard liquid 
scintillation detector (EJ-309 [16]). These spectral results will be demonstrated through 
measured neutron-capture-gated PHDs. Classification of neutron-scatter pulses and 




Data were collected with the BC-523A during the measurements performed at the 
JRC facility in Ispra. Figure 4-21 shows the neutron-scattering PHDs for four sources 
measured with the BC-523A detector. The amplitude of the PSD-attributed neutron pulse 
is related to the energy the scattered neutron deposit d in the liquid, resulting in a unique 
PHD for each sample. Figure 4-22 shows the neutron-capture-gated PHDs for the four 
neutron sources. Because the incident neutron must thermalize before it captures on 10B, 
we anticipate the preceding neutron scatter pulse to contain the majority of the initial 
neutron energy, assuming that it completely thermalized in the hydrocarbon organic 
material. Therefore, the capture-gated PHD omits neutron-scatter pulses from neutrons 
that escape the scintillator. As a result, we see th  capture-gated PHDs to relate more 
closely in shape than the scattering PHDs to the expected energy distribution of the 
neutrons entering the detector (shown in Fig. 4-22). 
 
Fig. 4-21. A comparison of the neutron scatter PHDs from the BC-523A for the four samples 
presented during this study. 
There are a few challenges present when using this dual-particle detection mode 
that must be considered. Primarily, the pulses produce  when detecting an alpha particle 
yield very little light, therefore the measurement threshold must be set relatively low. A 
lower threshold gives way to poorer PSD, as previously discussed. The next challenge is 
determining the time window in which to correlate alpha events with neutron scattering 
events. For these results, all alpha events were matched with the proceeding neutron 





Fig. 4-22. The simulated neutron energy distributions for the samples compared in this study 
(left) and a comparison of the capture-gated-neutron PHDs (right). The PHDs closely follow 
the trends of the anticipated neutron energy distributions entering the BC-523A detector. 
The neutron scatter PHDs alone allow the categorization of the measured nuclear 
materials. The PHDs that are developed through the neutron capture dual-pulse detection 
mode achieve the same goal, while providing more insight into the shape of the incident 
neutron energy distribution. The improved characterization ability that is gained using the 
dual-pulse detection mode results in a decrease in detection efficiency. Table 4-4 
summarizes the measured efficiencies and compares them o an EJ-309 detector and an 
NPOD 3He detector array. 
The measured detection efficiency for the standard liquid detectors used in this 
investigation was 45.47%, similar to the neutron scatter intrinsic efficiency for the BC-
523A detector (58.34%) prior to the pairing of alpha and neutron scatter pulses. The BC-
523A detector has a higher scattering detecting effici ncy only because a lower threshold 
was used to detect the low-light alpha-particle pulses. Once pairing capture pulses to 
scattering pulses for the neutron-capture-gated effici ncy, the intrinsic efficiency 
decreases to nearly 3% for the 252Cf case. Despite the cut in efficiency present when 
pairing with capture-pulses, the capture-gated intrinsic efficiencies for the BC-523A were 
still acceptable when compared to the NPOD system, a portable multiplicity counter, 




Table 4-4. Intrinsic efficiency values compared for a boron-loaded liquid scintillator (BC-
523A with a 50 keVee threshold), a standard liquid scintillator (EJ-309 with a 70 keVee 















BC-523A 58.34 2.72 51.50 1.98 
EJ-309 45.47 -- 35.48 -- 
NPOD 20.51 -- 14.67 -- 
In conclusion, capture-gated detectors such as the BC-523A have potential for 
SNM characterization, specifically spectroscopy beyond the capabilities of standard 
liquid scintillators. When considering the use of these detectors for safeguards and 
nonproliferation application, the low efficiency ofgetting spectral information must be 
kept in mind. 
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Chapter 5. Passive Neutron-Correlation Measurements 
Because MOX contains a significant amount of 240Pu (strong spontaneous fission 
source; ~1000 neutrons per second per gram) and alpha-emitting isotopes, a variety of 
passive neutron measurements are possible. Non-destructive passive assay of SNM 
requires much development but is a technique that is usually preferred to non-destructive 
active interrogation methods and destructive assay methods.  
Methods for passive fuel characterization include th  analysis of neutron energy 
distributions, time-of-flight distributions, cross-correlation functions, and neutron and 
photon multiplicity distributions. Measuring MOX fuel pins located at INL and MOX 
powder at the JRC in Ispra, Italy provided the opportunity to develop faster and more 
robust methods for characterization of SNM, with correlated neutron detection. Passive 
measurements were performed on a variety of neutron sources, including: a large number 
of fuel pins (totaling approximately 1 kg of plutonium) with varying isotopic 
composition, 1 kg of MOX powder, 252Cf, and Am-Be. The primary objective of these 
measurements was to differentiate and characterize the mentioned sources based on the 
analysis of neutron cross-correlation functions. 
5.1. Simulation of Passive Neutron Correlations 
Monte Carlo simulations were performed to study methods of using cross-
correlation functions to characterize MOX fuel. This approach allows development of 
accurate nuclear material characterization schemes, providing detailed insights into the 
sensitivity of nuclear materials and measurement approaches. The simulations include 
basic tallied neutron energy distributions, PHDs, and time-correlated particle detections. 
The MCNPX-PoliMi model of the measurement set-up, as shown in Fig. 5-1, 
includes four lead-shielded EJ-309 liquid scintillation detectors placed around the axis of 
the MOX fuel pin set-up (Fig. 5-2), with each detector equidistant from the source. Each 
detector was 12.7 cm ø and depth and each lead shiel  is 5-cm thick. The composition of 
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the fuel pins was varied during the simulations to m del two fuel-pin types, see Table 5-
1. A LO threshold of 75 keVee (75 keV electron equivalent) is used in post processing. 
 
Fig. 5-1.  MCNPX-PoliMi simulation of four cylindri cal EJ-309 liquid scintillators 
surrounding a MOX fuel can. Each detector is shielded by 5 cm of lead.  The MOX fuel can 
is supported by a 7.5-cm thick styrofoam stand. 
 
Fig. 5-2.  Cross-sectional view of the 90-pin MOX fuel can where the MOX fuel is modeled 
within the cladding (stainless steel, 0.5-mm thick) and the pins are contained by a 0.16-cm 
thick aluminum can. 
Table 5-1.  Isotopic composition of MOX fuel pins used for this work at INL [23] (age 






235U 0.17 0.16 
238U 74.78 72.13 
238Pu 0.01 0.01 
239Pu 11.42 10.98 
240Pu 1.53 4.10 
241Pu 0.17 0.58 
242Pu 0.02 0.02 
241Am 0.06 0.16 




sources that are common in MOX fuel. Two well
for measurement at INL. Both pin types are composed of various uranium, plutonium, 
and oxygen isotopes. The primary difference in the materials is in the mass of the 
isotope. This detail is significant as 
of advanced fuel. Table 5
what sources were simulated and their contributions t  the total neutron production rate. 
The SF of 238Pu, as well as the
their negligible contribution
values for the two fuel
Fig. 5-3.  Contributions (neutron emission rates) of spontaneous
present in the INL MOX pins to the total neutron production of fuel types #1 and #2.
MOX was also measured at the JRC in the form of twopowde
identical isotopic composition
samples and Fig. 5-4 describes the neutron source.
SF source and an Am-
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was used to model the spontaneous-fis ion (SF) and 
-defined fuel-pin types were a
240Pu is the primary neutron contributor for thi
-1 shows the composition of the INL fuel pins. Fig. 
 (α, n) sources 235U, 238U, and 241Pu were 
s to the total neutron source. The total neutron multiplication 
-pin assemblies were 1.13 and 1.14, respectively.
-fission and 
. Table 5-2 contains the MOX isotopic for the JRC powder 
 Also measured at the JRC were a 






omitted due to 
 
 
(α, n) sources 
 
r samples of 
252Cf 
 
Fig. 5-4.  Contributions to the total neutron productions by 
Table 5-2.  Isotopic composition of MOX powder used 
5.1.1. Simulation Results
Fig. 5-5a shows the simulated energy distributions of the neutrons emitted from 
the two 90-pin MOX fuel assemblies. The valleys located in the 
both spectra, specifically near 0.
elastic scattering cross 
shows the individual 
energy distribution of the Pin#1 MOX fuel assembly.
42 
SF and (α, n) sources present in 
the JRC MOX powders. 
at the JRC (age c







234U 0.05 0.06 
235U 4.79 5.50 
236U 0.05 0.06 
238U 670.50 769.48 
238Pu 0.24 0.27 
239Pu 111.81 127.02 
240Pu 47.00 53.39 
241Pu 1.67 1.90 
242Pu 3.38 3.84 
241Am 5.12 5.82 
O 166.22 184.00 
Total 1010.83 1151.33 
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orrected to the June 
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Fig. 5-5.  a) Simulated neutron energy distributions, tallied on the fuel-pin can (maintaining 
the pin assembly), for 90-pins of MOX fuel in comparison to the oxygen elastic scattering 
cross section. b) Simulated neutron energy distribution for 90-pins of Pin#1-type MOX fuel 
(tallied on the fuel-pin can) broken into its individual neutron source contributions. 
Currently, the measurement of neutron energy distributions of fissile materials is 
an area of much needed development. If the detection of these oxygen related spectral 
features were possible, SNM containing oxides would be identifiable. Additionally, the 
neutron energy distributions of Fig. 5-5 display both the fission neutron distributions and 
the (α, n) distributions. The detection of these regions can also point to the presence of 
MOX. These effects were apparent when studying the PHDs in Sect. 4.5.1. 
5.2. Passive Measurements of Fissile Material 
5.2.1. Passive Measurement Configurations 
The UM measurement system consisted of four cylindrical EJ-309 liquid 
scintillation detectors (12.7 cm ø by 12.7 cm), a fast digitizer, and data-acquisition and 
data-analysis algorithms. In the measurements, the det ctors were placed horizontally in 
90° intervals around a can of MOX fuel pins, with each detector equidistant from the 
sample, as shown in Fig. 5-6 for the INL measurements a d Fig. 4-18 for the JRC 
measurements. Detector pairs (at 90° or 180°) are used for time-correlated neutron and 
photon detections. Lead bricks (5-cm thick) were usd to shield the face of each detector 
as necessary to appropriately attenuate the fuel ass mbly’s photon background. 
 
Fig. 5-6.  Four EJ-309 liquid scintillators 
spacing from the center of the source to each of the detector faces. Five cm of lead shielding 
is present in front of each detector to decrease the gamma
The data acquisition system contained a
V1720 digitizer used to sample and store measured pulses. The experimental 
configurations included the two pin types (#1 and #2), packaged
canisters (as shown i  Fig. 5
cylinder. Measurement times varied based on the emission rate of the 
from 10 minutes to an hour
between the arrival times of two 
Fig. 5-7.  MOX fuel pins of well
5.2.2. Experimental Results
The primary goal of this study was to develop methodol gies to characterize 
SNM. Cross-correlation functions are 
cases with a well-controlled geometry
of the two fuel pin types in terms of separated correlation
photon, photon-neutron, and photon
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surrounding a 90-pin MOX fuel can with 40
-ray count rate.
 12-bit, 250-MHz,
-7). The MOX powder was contained in 
. Cross-correlation functions are obtained from differences 
c rrelated detection events [25], within 
 
-known composition were packaged into two cans in known 
quantities. 
 
suitable for such characterization
. Fig. 5-8 provides a comparison between 90 pins 
s (neutron




 8-channel, CAEN 
 in 90-pin quantity 
a stainless steel 
samples, ranging 
± 50 ns. 




between neutron and photon events allows more detailed study of those correlations 
which provide us with information about the source. 
 
Fig. 5-8.  Cross-correlation curves, including all possible particle combinations, 
discriminated into their components through a PSD processing algorithm. Measurement 
performed on Pin #1 (left) and Pin #2 (right) with the detectors spaced at 40 cm from the 
center of the source and a 75-keVee threshold. 
Fission is one of the few reactions that results in more than one neutron per decay. 
Thus, the analysis of neutron-neutron correlations provides valuable information on the 
presence of fissile material in an unknown sample. The increased presence of the 240Pu 
isotope in Pin #2 (and therefore expected increase in fission neutrons) is observed when 
comparing the neutron-neutron correlation curves in Fig. 5-9. Between –20 ns and 20 ns 
Pin #1 provided 4.59 ± 0.04 correlated neutron counts per second and Pin #2 provides 
14.02 ± 0.14 correlated neutron counts per second (values are summarized in Table 5-2). 
The difference in these count rates (~ a factor of 3) is very similar to the difference in the 
amount of 240Pu (a factor of 2.7). This technique is promising i terms of characterizing a 
sample’s fissile content and separating out the neutron detection that is caused by (α, n) 





Fig. 5-9.  Comparison of neutron-neutron correlations for the two INL MOX samples. 
Table 5-2.  Calculated neutron emission rate from spontaneous fission, measured neutron 
count rate, and measured correlated neutron count rate for the two MOX fuel-pin 
assemblies. 
 Pin #1 Assembly Pin #2 Assembly Pin #2/Pin #1 
SF Neutron Emission Rate 1.28E5 3.39E5 2.65 
Neutron Count Rate  2049.14 ± 0.91 4977.80 ± 2.59 2.43 
Correlated Neutron Count Rate 4.59 ± 0.04 14.02 ± 0.14 3.05 
 
Neutron-neutron correlations indicate the percentage of neutron emitting reactions 
that are a result of spontaneous or induced fission. Figure 5-10 shows the nn-correlation 
curves normalized by the known neutron-emission reaction rates for 252Cf, Am-Be, and 
MOX measured at the JRC. The magnitude the nn-correlation curves depicted in this 
manner increases with the percentage of spontaneous fission reactions: 252Cf is 100% SF, 
MOX is ~42% SF, and Am-Be is 100% AN. The nn-correlation curves are made up of 
correlated neutron detections from true correlated-n utron events, correlations from cross 
talk, and accidentals. Cross-talk events occur when a single neutron interacts in one 
detector, creates a recordable pulse, escapes the de ector, interacts in a second detector, 
and has enough remaining energy to create a second pulse over threshold. Cross-talk 
events are false coincidence events that are often difficult to distinguish from true events. 
For this reason, the non-fissile Am-Be source has fal e correlated-neutron events, and 
their location helps identify them as primarily cross-talk events due to the large time-
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differences compared to the zero centered distribution that is seen from fission. Cross-
talk events are present in the 252Cf and MOX measurements, but are more prevalent in the 
Am-Be measurement due to its higher average neutron energy, making it more probable 
for neutrons to have enough remaining energy after th  first detected pulse, to create a 
second one in a different detector. 
 
Fig. 5-10. Neutron-neutron correlations for three samples measured at the JRC facility, 
normalized by their known neutron emission reaction rates. 
Additionally, comparisons can be made between the nn-correlation integrals 
(between -20 and 20 ns), for 180-degree and 90-degree detector pairs for each 
measurement, as shown in Fig. 5-11. These comparisons depict the anisotropy of fission 
neutrons, theoretically and experimentally observed [26]. For Pin #1 the ratio of 180-
degree/90-degree correlated neutrons is 1.02 ± 0.02 while Pin #2 has a ratio of 1.12 ± 
0.02. The simulations predict this ratio to be 1.03 for both measurement configurations. 
The 90-degree neutron correlations are artificially increased by the presence of cross talk 
in the system (which contributes approximately 6% of the correlations in the 90-degree 
pairs and only about 2% in the 180-degree pairs). Therefore, the effect of anisotropy is 
higher than shown in the ratios, and a cross-talk corre tion on the data would lead to 
more accurate results. We expect this ratio to be nearer to 6.0 for 2-MeV neutrons in an 
unshielded case [27]. The simultaneous detection of time-correlated neutrons and the 




Fig. 5-11.  Comparison of neutron-neutron correlations for the 90-degree and 180-degree 
correlated neutron counts from Pin #2. 
5.3. Validation of MCNPX-PoliMi 
In addition to understanding the measured results, it is important to use the 
measurements to verify the validity of the Monte Carlo simulation methodology. 
MCNPX-PoliMi and its post-processing algorithm are ble to simulate realistic detector 
response.  
Table 5-3. Averaged differences between PHD simulated and measured values for data 






Average  Absolute 
Difference (%) 
MOX Pin#1 13.0 19.3 
MOX Pin#2 20.0 35.0 
MOX Powder 22.6 30.0 
252Cf 1.4 19.3 
Am-Be 15.4 11.0 
Fig. 5-12 is an absolute comparison between measured and simulated neutron 
PHDs. Good agreement is noted between the two curves: av rage differences are shown 
in Table 5-3 ranging from 1.4 to 22.6 %. This comparison confirms MCNPX-PoliMi’s 
ability to provide not only accurate simulation of the detector response but also of the SF 
and AN reactions present in MOX fuel. Fig. 5-13 shows a measurement and simulation of 
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the neutron-neutron correlation curves for all measured samples discussed in this section. 
Similar agreement between the correlation curves is observed for the measurement and 
the simulation (between 11.0 and 35.0 % on average). 
 
Fig. 5-12.  Absolute comparison of simulated and measured neutron PHDs for INL MOX 
assemblies (left) and JRC MOX/neutron sources (right). 
 
Fig. 5-13.  Absolute comparison of neutron-neutron correlation curves for all simulated and 
measured detector pairs for INL MOX assemblies (left) and JRC MOX/neutron sources 
(right). 
5.4. Summary and Conclusions 
This work was a result of detailed simulation and experimental efforts to study 
MOX samples and standard neutron emitting isotopic sources located at INL and the JRC 
in Ispra, Italy. The experimental set-ups were derived from detailed Monte Carlo 
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modeling which incorporated accurate detector respon e functions. Detailed models of 
the neutron source from MOX fuels were presented, which included two SF and four AN 
contributions. The neutron energy spectrum incident on he detectors was determined and 
studied for its features that may lead to characterization of SNM such as MOX.  
Neutron and photon cross-correlation functions were measured for the various 
experimental configurations. The separate contributions to these functions were discussed 
and analyzed. The results show that this type of measurement can be used to identify the 
presence of fission neutrons from MOX fuel and distinguish them from AN neutrons. The 
ability to differentiate photon and neutron time-correlated events is a novel approach to 
SNM characterization. Future efforts would benefit from comparing plutonium 
containing materials with larger variation in isotopic composition and neutron emission. 
The Monte Carlo particle transport code MCNPX-PoliMi has the capability to 
accurately model interactions that are necessary fo b th of these measurement 
techniques. Good agreement was obtained between the simulated and measured neutrons. 
In addition to contributing to the development of an experimental methodology, this 
study worked as a basis for the validation of the MCNPX-PoliMi code for the 
development of measurement systems to characterize MOX type fuel assemblies. 
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Chapter 6. Active Neutron-Correlation Measurements 
Fissile materials are of interest in the nuclear safeguards field because they help 
provide energy across the world, but can also be used in nuclear weapons. Methods of 
verifying the peaceful use of these materials rely on measuring the presence of fissile 
material and/or confirming that no significant quantities of known materials have been 
diverted. When it comes to measuring plutonium, the material’s spontaneous fission 
probability is quite high allowing passive neutron measurements for material 
characterization. Contrarily, passive measurements are often impractical when 
quantifying uranium, considering the spontaneous fis ion yield of all uranium isotopes is 
quite low; therefore we must rely on measuring induced fission. As a result, active-
interrogation techniques are required for characterizing nuclear fuels containing only 
uranium, as is common in many nuclear facilities around the world [28]. 
6.1. Characterizing Uranium-Oxides with Liquid Scintilla tors 
Using the simulation tool MCNPX-PoliMi, a detection system was designed to 
measure induced-fission neutrons from 235U and 238U. Measurements were then 
performed in the summer of 2011 at the JRC in Ispra, Italy. Low-enriched uranium 
(LEU) samples were interrogated and induced-fission neutrons were measured to 
characterize the samples in terms of their uranium mass and enrichment. The 
measurement system included high-energy neutron (14.1 MeV; deuterium-tritium 
reaction) and low-energy neutron (0.23 MeV; moderated Am-Li source) active-
interrogation sources. The purpose of the measurement campaign was to investigate the 
potential applicability of using organic liquid scintillators with active-interrogation 
techniques to characterize uranium containing materials. Additionally, MCNPX-PoliMi 
simulation results will be compared to the measured t nds to validate the MCNPX-




6.1.1. Description of Measured LEU 
Three well-characterized LEU samples were available for xperiments at the JRC. 
Table 6-1 outlines the variation of these samples in terms of their uranium mass and 
enrichment. Through the use of active interrogation, we see the differences in uranium 
mass and 235U enrichment by inducing fission in these three materi ls. The neutron-
induced fission cross sections for 235U and 238U are shown in Fig. 6-1 [24]. Based on 
these cross sections, a varying induced fission response is seen by probing the three LEU 
samples separately with both slow and fast neutrons. 
Table 6-1. Material specifications for the three LEU samples studied at the JRC. 
Sample Uranium Mass  
[g] 




LEU-1 1691.93 16.60 1 
LEU-2 2374.40 73.83 3.1 
LEU-3 2374.96 118.19 5 
 
Fig. 6-1. Neutron-induced fission cross sections for 235U and 238U for fast neutrons. The 235U 
cross section increases at thermal and epithermal en rgies while the 238U cross section 
decreases significantly. 
6.2. Active-Interrogation Simulations 
Using MCNPX-PoliMi, a system was designed to measure induced-fission 
neutrons from 235U and 238U. The system made use of a deuterium-tritium (DT) neutron 
generator for inducing fission in the uranium. The generator was equipped with an alpha 
detector to determine the time and direction of neutron emission. The liquid scintillators 






































then measured the emitted fission neutrons while minimizing the measurement of 
transmitted and scattered DT neutrons. As shown in Fig. 1, the DT neutrons will induce 
fission in both 235U and 
present. DT neutron generators always emit some neutrons at 2.45 MeV due to deuterium 
impurities in the tritium target leading to deuterium
actual DT-neutron energy depends on the angle of the emitted neutron.
energy (yet still fast) neutrons still arrive in a regi
where there is a large separation between 
the uranium, we must probe the source at very low neutron energies (ideally thermal) to 
study only the 235U presence in the LEU. To do this, a high
moderated Am-Li source (0.23 MeV neutrons on average after moderation) was used as 
an additional interrogation 
6.2.1. Neutron Interactions in 
Fig. 6-2. Simulated neutron
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238U, providing information on the overall amount of uranium 
-deuterium fusion.
on of the induced
235U and 238U. To learn about the enrichment
source. 
LEU 
-interaction probabilities from the three interrogated LEU 
samples. 
 In addition, the 
 These lower 





MCNPX-PoliMi output includes a detailed history of all of the interactions that 
happen within a volume of interest, including all of the histories of subsequent particles 
that are created. By simulating active
as the volume of interest, we can gauge the usefulness of different active sources to 
characterize a particular quantity of interest. Fig. 6
neutron source and an Am
were measured. 
6.2.2. Models for Mass and Enrichment Studies
The DT generator emits neutr
canister. The detectors were placed directly above the LEU sample outside of the cone of 
‘timed-tagged’ neutrons. 
statistics while keeping detectors spa
talk. Fig. 6-3a shows the MCNPX
Am-Li interrogation case, the radionuclide source was surrounded by polyethylene 
moderator and placed under the LEU samp
of Am-Li neutrons and primarily measure photons and neutrons that are created in the 
LEU from the incident Am
(a) 
Fig. 6-3. MCNPX-PoliMi model of the five 
LEU sample) measuring induced
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-interrogation cases and specifying the LEU sample 
-2 depicts the types of interaction a DT 
-Li neutron source induce within the three 
 
ons in a ‘time-tagged cone’ at the side of the LEU 
Five detectors were used to maximize the measurement 
ced far enough apart to decrease 
-PoliMi model for the DT interrogation case. For the 
le in order to minimize the direct contribution 
-Li particles, as shown in Fig. 6-3b. 
 
      (b)
liquid scintillators (~35 cm from the center of the 
-fission neutrons for the DT interrogation case (a) and the 
moderated Am-Li interrogation case (b). 
 
LEU samples that 





Fissions were induced with an associated
radionuclide Am-Li source. The fission neutrons, as well as neutrons from (n, 2n) and (n, 
3n) reactions, were measured with five cylindrical 12.7
liquid scintillators. The DT neutron ge
campaign in place by Padova University
measurement configuration. 
Fig. 6-4. The five-detector geometry positions the liquid scintillator faces at approximately 
35 cm from the top of the LEU canister. The associated particle tagged DT neutrons are 
emitted in the direction coming out of the page. Also shown is the moderated Am
6.3.1. Data Acquisition and Analyse
The measurement and data
(12-bit, 250-MHz) and PSD algorithms to differentiate neutron and photon 
digitizer has eight cha
associated alpha detector and the remaining five for the liquid scintillators. The three 
LEU samples of varying mass and enrichment, shown in Table 
separately with the high
were then analyzed to draw relationships between detected neutrons and sample mass and 
enrichment. 
The PSD algorithm, applied above a 75 
energy), is important to iso
2n), and (n, 3n) neutrons. Presence of (n, 2n) reactions require greater than ~5 MeV 
incident neutrons while (n, 3n) reactions require more that ~11 MeV incident neutrons, 
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Measurements 
 particle DT generator and a moderated 
 cm ø by 12.7 cm
n rator was available as part of a measurement 
 [29]. Fig. 6-4 shows two photographs of the 
 
placed under the LEU canister. 
s 
- cquisition system utilized a CAEN V1720 digitizer 
nnels, six of which were used: one for the DT generator’s 
6
-energy and low-energy neutron sources. Acquired 
keVee threshold (~0.7 MeV neutron 
late the neutron signal that comes from the induced fission, (n, 




-1, were interrogated 
TOF curves 
 
therefore only the DT interrogation cases will result in such a signal. In the DT 
interrogation case, PSD
distribution. In the Am
identify the photon-neutron correlations that are studied here as a pseudo
The PSD technique for the DT measurements and the Am
in Fig. 6-5. The effect of photon misclassification is more significant with the Am
measurement configura
interrogating source; this can be seen in Fig. 
(a) 
Fig. 6-5. PSD technique applied to
higher photon flux of the Am
6.4. Uranium Mass Investigation
When using the associated particle DT generator, a
signal when a DT event emits a neutron in the direction of our LEU 
signal as a trigger, a TOF measurement can be performed, thus measuring the arrival time 
of particles created in the LEU sample. The triggering alpha detector is a YAP 
scintillation detector that is known to display good timing proper
between the LEU sample and the five detectors (~35 cm) must be chosen to provide 





 allows the removal of photon accidentals in the neutron TOF 
-Li interrogation case, PSD is more important as it allows us to 
-Li measurements is portrayed 
tions due to the strong photon emission inherent in the 
6-5
      (b)
 a) the DT interrogated LEU-3 measurements and 
-Li interrogated LEU-3 measurements where the neutron 









detector provides a 
sample. By using this 
 [29]. The distance 
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6.4.1. Simulation Results 
Fig. 6-6a shows the simulated TOF results for the DT interrogated LEU samples. 
The photon signal can be eliminated and we can focus n the change in the neutron TOF 
curves for the three LEU samples. The neutron TOF curve in Fig. 6-6a shows variations 
in slope along the leading edge (25 – 30 ns), it is in this location that 14 MeV neutrons 
elastically scatter on the LEU, lose very little energy, and arrive quickly at the detectors 
and create a pulse by depositing less than 2 MeV (the upper limit of the data acquisition). 
The TOF curves showed that the mass of the LEU sample would trend with the amount 
of induced fission events, (n, 2n), and (n, 3n) events for samples of similar geometry. 
Therefore, the integrals of these neutron TOF curves provide information on the sample 
mass, as shown in Fig. 6-6b. 
 
(a)       (b) 
Fig. 6-6. a) Simulated photon and neutron TOF curves for time-tagged DT interrogation of 
the three LEU samples with error bars that are smaller than the data point symbols, and b) 
the trend of the total neutron counts with uranium mass where the LEU-2 and LEU-3 points 
are overlapping. 
6.4.2. Experimental Results 
Fig. 7a shows the measured neutron TOF curves for the DT interrogated LEU 
samples, including statistical uncertainty. Fig. 6-7b shows the trend in the total neutron 
counts with uranium mass. The neutron counts trend appropriately with uranium mass, 
with the two canisters of equal mass having approximately the same neutron TOF 




(a)       (b) 
Fig. 6-7. a) Measured neutron TOF curves for time-tagged DT interrogation of the three 
LEU samples and b) the trend of the total neutron counts with uranium mass. 
6.5. Uranium-235 Enrichment Investigation 
Fig. 6-8 shows the results of the 235U enrichment investigation, where the 
moderated Am-Li neutrons will induce fission primarily in 235U. The 235U fission 
neutrons’ TOF will be measured in the liquid scintilla ors by triggering on the photons 
produced during the induced nuclear interactions. 
6.5.1. Simulation Results 
The pseudo-TOF curves for the simulated Am-Li cases ar  shown in Fig. 6-8a. 
The relationship between the enrichment and these thre  curves is shown in Fig. 6-8b. 
 
(a)       (b) 
Fig. 6-8. a) Simulated photon-triggered neutron TOF curves for the moderated Am-Li 




6.5.2. Experimental Results 
Fig. 6-9a shows the measured photon-neutron correlations for the Am-Li 
interrogated LEU. Fig. 6-9b shows the trend of correlations with LEU enrichment. It is 
difficult to directly compare the LEU-1 sample to the LEU-2 and LEU-3 samples, as the 
mass is not consistent, although the general trend agrees with what is expected. The 
relationship between neutron counts and both uranium mass and enrichment follow the 
MCNPX-PoliMi predicted trends. The trends between the simulated (Fig. 6-8b) and 
measured (Fig. 6-9b) neutron counts versus enrichment ar  very similar, with the primary 
difference being in the vertical magnitude of the entir  curve, as the simulations under-
predict the system response. This non-linear behavior of the counts with enrichment (or 
mass) is rather typical of all active measurements wi h low energy Am-Li sources; the 
trend is due to the limited penetration of neutrons in the material that reduces the fraction 
of the sample that is interrogated when the sample size increases. 
 
(a)       (b) 
Fig. 6-9. a) Measured photon-triggered neutron TOF curves for the moderated Am-Li 
configurations and b) the trend of the total photon-neutron correlations with 235U 
enrichment (with error bars smaller than that data point symbols). 
6.6. Validating MCNPX-PoliMi/MPPost for Active-Interroga tion Applications 
MCNPX-PoliMi was used to design the measurement system and could further be 
used to optimize such a measurement system and extend its applicability. In order to use 
the simulation package for such activities, it is helpful to validate the simulated active-
interrogation scenarios with the measured results. 
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Initially, a passive 252Cf-source correlation measurement was performed with a 
well-characterized source to be compared with an MCNPX-PoliMi-simulated 
measurement. Good agreement has been observed between different organic liquid 
scintillation measurement systems and 252Cf sources in the past. These past observations 
are consistent with the present measurement system, as shown in Fig. 6-10, where the 
cross-correlation distributions from the measurement and the simulation agree well. The 
peaks in the measured neutron-photon and photon-neutro  distributions near time zero 
are primarily due to PSD misclassification of photons as neutrons. A relative small 
amount of measured data was collected for the 252Cf source, hence the statistical 
fluctuations in the measured results. 
 
Fig. 6-10: Measured and MCNPX-PoliMi-simulated cros-correlation distributions for a 
single detector pair in conjunction with a bare 252Cf source. 
Due to the uncertainties associated with the use of the DT generator, it is difficult 
to make an absolute comparison between the simulation nd measured results. Much of 
the error lies in details associated with the alpha trigger detector (YAP scintillator), 
including the poor knowledge of the detector’s orientation and thus the neutron-beam 
diameter at the LEU sample, the inability to distinguish between photon and alpha events 
in the detector leading to accidental correlated events in the measurements, the instability 
of the neutron generator output, and the unknown locati n of the neutron-event threshold. 
Due to the proprietary nature of the use of the DT generator, all these unknowns could 
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not be resolved. These uncertainties can be minimized with a better characterized DT-
generator/measurement system. 
When considering active-interrogation simulations, more successful comparisons 
are made between the simulated and measured Am-Li cases. Previous work with Am-Li 
sources demonstrated better correlation results when neutrons from Am-Be and AmO2 
radionuclide sources were included in the source model [30]. The true ‘contaminant’ 
levels were unknown and therefore the Am-Be and AmO2 neutron sources were added to 
better match a measured neutron PHD of the Am-Li interrogation source. The simulated 
Am-Li source was defined with 1.2% of the total neutron emission originating from an 
Am-Be neutron source and 1% from an AmO2 source. 
Figure 6-11 shows the MCNPX-PoliMi simulations and measurements of the 
TOF distributions of the LEU sample with moderated Am-Li. The simulated 
measurement TOF distribution behaves similarly to the measurement results but with 
lower count rates across the entire distribution. The simulation likely under-estimates the 
count rate due to uncertainties in the source activity, the source spectrum, un-modeled 
details of the surroundings and the high-density pol ethylene density. 
 
Fig. 6-11. Absolute comparison of measured and simulated TOF distributions for the 






6.7. Summary and Conclusions 
An active-interrogation measurement and simulation campaign was performed 
with the aim of characterizing uranium-containing materials. Active-interrogation 
methods were investigated, including a DT generator nd a moderated Am-Li source. 
Time-correlation techniques were used to measure neutron-induced fission in LEU 
powder samples. MCNPX-PoliMi was used for the system design and understanding of 
the measured trends. 
It was observed that 14.1 MeV neutrons induced fission in 235U and 238U isotopes, 
allowing the total uranium mass to be determined from neutron TOF measurements. 
Then, the supplemental use of low-energy neutrons from a moderated Am-Li source to 
induce fission in primarily 235U, allowed conclusions as to the relative 235U enrichment.  
The standard charge integration PSD method appropriately discriminated photon 
events from neutron events in the liquid scintillators. This approach allowed the thorough 
analysis of neutron TOF distributions with the ability to eliminate photon accidentals. It 
also allowed pseudo-TOF distributions to be formed from the Am-Li interrogation cases 
by triggering on the photons that are emitted from the nuclear reactions in the LEU. It 
would be beneficial to investigate a broader range of uranium-containing materials. With 
more information on the response of a liquid scintillators system, advanced algorithms 




Chapter 7. Passive Neutron-Multiplicity Measurements 
Typical of fission reactions is the emission of multiple neutrons simultaneously. 
Therefore, instrumentation that measures neutron multiplicity is an excellent way to 
quantify the amount of fissionable material present. Neutron multiplicity counters are 
common in nuclear safeguards efforts using 3He detectors. Neutron detectors containing 
3He have a high efficiency for neutron detection when n utrons are moderated to thermal 
energies. Well established theory to analyze the signals (neutron coincidence or 
multiplicity) that come from systems containing many 3He detectors provides values such 
as the mass of SNM. Measurement of mass with low uncertainty is needed to verify 
nuclear-material declarations.  
Neutrons emitted from fission are not in fact thermal and organic scintillators 
have good efficiency over the range of fission neutrons, as discussed in Sect. 4.3. 
Additionally, organic scintillators are inherently fast and solve problems associated with 
dead time in traditional systems. An FNMC addresses th  urgent need to innovate 3He 
alternative systems to meet future safeguards needs an  expand the scope of current 
safeguards measurement systems.  
In the efforts to develop an FNMC at the UM, a small-scale system was 
developed for proof-of-concept simulations and measurements. The system made use of 
liquid organic scintillation detectors for fast-neutron detection of fissile materials. Such a 
system is expected to quantify small masses of plutoni m inventory using neutron 
coincidence. MCNPX-PoliMi/MPPost codes were being used for the full-system design 
and therefore validation with a small-scale system was necessary to proceed with the 
design process. The validation measurements were perform d on nuclear materials at the 
JRC in Ispra, Italy in April of 2012. The measurements highlight neutron coincidence 




7.1. Simulating Neutron Multiplicity
The radiation source and the experimental geometry we e modeled with MCNPX
PoliMi. Two different types of nuclear materials were measured and simulated, a 
powder and PuO2 pellets. Two MOX samples and nine P
two MOX samples and three combinations of the nine PuO
represent five different 
240Pueff mass as a function of the masses of the even
Built-in MCNPX
sources present in the samples containing both plutonium and oxygen: 
spontaneous fissions and 
the make-up of the neutron source for both the PuO
neutron sources (including 
total neutron emission, were omitted. For all of the five configurations, detailed 
information was recorded for four organic scintillaon detectors. These data were then 
analyzed using MPPost to arrive at PHDs a
(a)
Fig. 7-1. The neutron
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uO2 pellets were studied. The 
2 pellets were measured to 
240Pu effective (240Pueff) masses. Equation 7
-numbered plutonium isotopes
  
-PoliMi sources were used to simulate the neutron and photon 
238Pu, 239Pu, 240Pu, and 241Am (α, n) reactions. Figure 
2 and MOX samples. Negligible 
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7.2. Measurement of Fast-Neutron Coincidence with Liquid Scintillators 
At the JRC’s Laboratory, a UM measurement system (Fig. 7-2) was utilized to 
measure fissile materials and the measurements wereth n simulated with MCNPX-
PoliMi/MPPost. The data were valuable to test data-an lysis algorithms for their potential 
and limitations. Benchmarking the simulation efforts with the measured results built 
confidence in the use of simulation and modeling tools, specifically MCNPX-
PoliMi/MPPost, to facilitate a design process for the development of an FNMC. Such a 
measurement system would contain numerous standard liqui scintillators; specifically 
Eljen Technology manufactured EJ-309s. Additionally within the system, a small amount 
of lead shielding was used to reduce the photon flux from the samples.  
 
Fig. 7-2. All experimental configurations included four 7.62 cm ø x 7.62 cm liquid 
scintillators 20 cm from the center of the measured samples. The configuration depicted 
includes nine PuO2 pellets with 0.25 cm of lead shielding present, measured with a 70 keVee 
LO threshold. 
7.2.1. Description of Plutonium-Containing Materials Measured 
By measuring PuO2 and MOX samples of varying mass, the trend between 
neutron doubles rate and plutonium mass was assessed. This trend provides a value that 
will work as a sensitivity-metric for the design process. The measured plutonium masses 
included PuO2 pellets, ranging from 20 to 60 g, and MOX samples, 160 and 190 g, with 




















234U -- -- -- 0.05 0.06 
235U -- -- -- 4.79 5.50 
236U -- -- -- 0.05 0.06 
238U -- -- -- 670.50 769.48 
238Pu 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.24 0.27 
239Pu 14.24 39.66 52.33 111.81 127.02 
240Pu 5.39 9.31 11.26 47.00 53.39 
241Pu 0.13 0.23 0.27 1.67 1.90 
242Pu 0.29 0.37 0.41 3.38 3.84 
241Am 0.80 1.33 1.59 5.12 5.82 
O 2.75 6.75 8.74 166.22 184.00 
Total 23.63 57.68 74.65 1010.83 1151.33 
A 252Cf source was also measured for validation purposes. The measured 
materials are similar to those measured in low-level plutonium-sample inventory counters 
and helped provide insight into how organic scintillation detectors can find use in 
characterizing such materials. The measurement system used in this study uses only a 
fraction of the number of detectors an ideal prototype would contain. 
7.2.2. Measurement System 
To achieve portability, the measurement campaign in April 2012 used a 4-channel 
USB digitizer (CAEN DT5720) and a data-acquisition laptop to acquire data from four 
detectors (7.62 cm ø by 7.62 cm EJ-309s). These scintillators detect both neutrons and 
photons via scattering events in the hydrocarbon material; both particle types create 
pulses that are digitized, and kept for data analysis. The digitizer has a 12-bit resolution 
(11-bits effective) and a 250-MHz sampling frequency which is sufficient to identify the 
slight pulse-shape difference between the two types of interactions via PSD algorithms, 
shown in Fig. 7-3.  
Due to the high photon emission from plutonium-containing materials, a thin lead 
shield (0.25 cm for PuO2 and 1 cm for MOX) was also present. The detectors were placed 
at 20 cm from the center of the source and were arranged in a small arc with 




Fig. 7-3.  Measured neutrons (upper region) and phot ns (lower region) from the shielded 
PuO2 source measured at a 70 keVee light-output threshold (approximately 650 keV neutron 
energy deposited). A discrimination curve is shown that was used the separate neutrons 
from photons. 
7.2.3. Measurement-Data Analysis 
In order to quantify plutonium mass in nuclear materi ls it is common to rely on 
the detection of fission rate from a variety of plutonium isotopes. Measuring the fission 
rate is possible using neutron-multiplicity measurement techniques [5]. Neutron-
multiplicity measurements are beneficial due to theemission of multiple neutrons 
spontaneously from a single reaction, which is uniqe to fission. In this work, plutonium-
mass information will be gathered from the measured neutron doubles rate. Such neutron-
multiplicity results were found by counting the coincident fast-neutron events in short 
time windows (~100 ns) [31]. A constant fraction delay method (with 0.5 as the fraction) 
is used to identify the arrival time of each pulse. Two PSD-attributed neutrons that arrive 
within the time window are considered coincident and contribute to the neutron-doubles 
rate. If a third neutron is detected within the time window the event is considered a 
neutron triple and does not contribute to the neutron-doubles rate, the same applies for all 







7.3. Measurement Results and Validation of MCNPX-PoliMi/MPPost 
7.3.1. Measured and Simulated PHDs 
Figure 7-4 shows the measured normalized PHDs for the two different types of 
plutonium and 252Cf. The shapes of these distributions shed light on he type of neutron 
source that is being measured, for example a plutonium-metal sample will give different 
PHD results than a PuO2 sample due primarily to differences in the neutron scattering 
cross section of the material matrix [32]. This information can prove useful to tailor mass 
quantification equations to specific nuclear materil types. To validate the simulation 
methodology, Fig. 7-5 shows an absolute comparison (on a linear scale) of neutron PHDs 
with good agreement between the simulated and measured results from a 252Cf source and 
one of the configurations of PuO2 pellets (#2 described in Table 7-1). The average point-
by-point agreement between the simulated and measurd results are 6.8% and 10.6% 
respectively, with most of the discrepancy coming from the low LO region where PSD is 
less accurate. 
 





Fig. 7-5. Simulated and measured 252Cf PHDs (left) with an average point-by-point 
agreement error of 6.8% and simulated and measured PuO2 PHDs (right) with an average 
point-by-point agreement error of 10.6%. Statistical errors shown on the data points are 
smaller than the symbols used. 
7.3.2. Neutron Coincidence 
Sensitivity and efficiency of the measurement system was studied via the 
measured doubles rates (neutron coincidence) for PuO2 and MOX samples, outlined in 
Table 7-1. Figure 7-6 shows the relationship between th  neutron coincidence rate and 
the 240Pueff mass is linear across all of the PuO2 and MOX samples. 
  
Fig. 7-6. Relationship between simulated and measured neutron doubles rates and 240Pueff 
mass. Differences listed relate the simulated and measured data while statistical error bars 
shown on the data points are smaller than the symbols used. 
70 
 
Good agreement is observed for neutron doubles rateov r a range of plutonium 
mass (also shown in Fig. 7-6). The difference betwen measurement and simulation for 
the three lower-mass plutonium samples was of the ord r of a few percent. The difference 
between the measurement and simulation for the larger masses was approximately 15%. 
Likely causes for the difference between simulated an  measured values are misclassified 
photon events contributing to the neutron doubles rate and accidental neutron doubles, 
both forms of inaccuracy artificially ‘inflate’ the results. Additionally, large uncertainties 
in our knowledge of the density and volume of the MOX powders contribute to the error 
in the comparison of simulated and measured doubles. Finding good agreement between 
the simulated and measured neutron doubles is crucial considering the doubles rate is the 
result of primary concern for the design process.  
Linear trends were independently fit to measured ansimulated results. The 
sensitivity of the system can be characterized by the slope of the relationship. A more 
sensitive system will display a trend that has a larger slope and a more efficient system 
will display a trend with a higher overall magnitude. For the bench-top system used at the 
JRC, the sensitivity based on the measured data was 0.100 ±0.001 neutron doubles per 
second per gram (the slope of the line fit to the measured data points in Fig. 7-6 where 
the error is the standard deviation of said linear r gression slope). Due to uncertainty in 
the MOX simulations, the simulated data predict a less sensitive measurement system 
with a sensitivity value of 0.082 ± 0.001 neutrons doubles per second per gram. Table 7-2 
gives the deviation of the doubles rates from the fit for both the simulated and measured 
data. The results show that the linear fit is a reason ble choice. 











Simulation -4.75 0.62 2.36 -0.39 0.48 
Measurement 0.00 -2.41 2.52 -0.45 0.43 
The measurement system had promising absolute efficiencies of 4.20 ± 0.05 % for 
neutron singles and 0.061 ± 0.001 % for neutron doubles measured with a 252Cf source 
(error calculations take into account statistical uncertainty, source strength uncertainty, 
and PSD misclassification). Statistical uncertainty of doubles less than 5% can be 
achieved in 10 minutes for the smallest measured plutonium mass. This result is 
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encouraging considering the final system design will include more detectors and cover a 
significantly larger solid angle. 
7.4. FNMC Simulations for Prototype Design 
Current simulation efforts focus on studying trends in the detector shape, size, 
number, and configuration to achieve high efficiency, high sensitivity, and minimal 
dependence on sample placement. Examples of potential se ups are shown in Fig. 7-7. An 
ideal detector design will not only perform accurately and efficiently, but also maintain a 
minimally intrusive geometry in terms of size and weight. With a list of candidate 
designs, bench-top experiments are being performed at UM to work towards fine-tuning 
the design. 
a) b)  
c)    d)  
Fig. 7-7. Examples of FNMC models: (a) UM measurement system used in the present work 
based on EJ-309 liquid scintillators, (b) a full ring (12 detectors) of 7.62 cm ø by 7.62 cm EJ-
309s, (c) two rings of 7.62 cm ø by 12.7 cm EJ-309s, and (d) three rings of 12.7 cm ø by 5.08 
cm EJ-309s.  The models include the active volume of the EJ-309s, 0.25 cm of lead shielding, 
and PuO2 pellets. 
Using MCNPX-PoliMi/MPPost many detector configurations were tested with 
numerous types of plutonium-containing materials of varying plutonium mass. We 
simulated the JRC’s PuO2 pellets as they were measured during the measurement 
campaign described in this work. Simulated results in Fig. 7-8 show how the doubles 
rate, from various system designs, trends with increasing 240Pueff mass. Figure 7-9 shows 
the triples rates versus the 240Pueff mass. Designs included either one, two, or three rings 
of liquid scintillators. The liquid scintillator dimensions were either 7.62 or 12.7 cm ø 
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and varied in length between 2.54 to 12.7 cm. The slope of the doubles rate curves shown 
in Fig. 7-7 is then the sensitivity metric for determining the responsiveness of the 
simulated systems to plutonium mass. From the three simulated PuO2 samples, the third 
point deviates most from a linear trend due to all of the added canister material present 
for this particular case. The first two cases include one pellet and three pellets 
respectively, while the third case has nine pellets. The large increase in the steel casing 
has a small effect on the neutron doubles leading to the slight decrease in expected rate. 
This noted decrease is not present when the materials are modeled with the absence of 
their containers.  
   
Fig. 7-8. The trend of simulated doubles rates with plutonium mass for 21 FNMC designs. 
The number of detectors and the detector size were varied. Each figure shows the response 
for one, two, or three detector rings where the staistical errors are smaller than the symbols 
used. 
  
Fig. 7-9. The trend of simulated triples rates with plutonium mass for 21 FNMC designs. The 
number of detectors and the detector size were varied. Each figure shows the response for 






Table 7-3. The sensitivity of each design portrayed in Fig. 9. 
Detector Shape 
(diameter x length) 
Sensitivity 
(Doubles Rate/g of 240Pueff) 
  One Ring Two Rings Three Rings 
7.62 cm ø by 5.08 cm 0.75 ± 0.05 3.05 ± 0.22 5.81 ± 0.33 
7.62 cm ø by 7.62 cm 1.12 ± 0.05 4.68 ± 0.34 8.99 ± 0.55 
7.62 cm ø by 12.7 cm 1.55 ± 0.08 6.89 ± 0.47 13.36 ± 0.81 
12.7 cm ø by 2.54 cm 0.81 ± 0.08 2.9 ± 0.28 4.81 ± 0.35 
12.7 cm ø by 5.08 cm 2.03 ± 0.20 7.21 ± 0.72 12.11 ± 1.01 
12.7 cm ø by 7.62 cm 2.93 ± 0.29 10.61 ± 0.99 18.05 ± 1.49 
12.7 cm ø by 12.7 cm 3.94 ± 0.38 14.29 ± 1.38 25.3 ± 2.08 
Table 7-3 gives the sensitivity of each of the design . As expected, systems that 
cover the most solid angle and have the greatest detector volumes perform best. The 
simulated triples rates embody the same trends as the doubles curves, while providing an 
order of magnitude less counts and sensitivity. Additionally, the percent increase of 
neutron triples events per gram is consistent with hat is seen with the neutron doubles 
trends.  
The design with three rings of 12.7 cm ø by 12.7 cm detectors performs best, as it 
yields the highest doubles rate, resulting in the lowest uncertainty on the 240Pueff mass, 
and also has the largest size and weight. A system with two rings of detectors 7.62 cm ø 
by 7.62 cm is more manageable and the sensitivity does not decrease significantly. By 
decreasing the detector depth, less cross-talk events are present in the neutron doubles. 
Additionally, the smaller liquid cells (such as the 7.62 cm ø by 7.62 cm detectors) 
provide better timing and PSD capabilities than larger cells (12.7 cm ø by 12.7 cm 
detectors). This trend is further confirmed for much larger volumes that have been 
previously studied [33]. In fact, detectors with cells having large volume suffer from light 
attenuation and degradation of the PSD performance, requiring a higher LO threshold, 
resulting in lower overall system efficiency. Cylindrical-shaped detector volumes with 
matching photo-multiplier tubes were chosen throught the design process for their 
optimal light collection and PSD performance, providing an improvement over past 





7.5. Summary and Conclusions 
Results on neutron coincidence measurements of PuO2 and MOX with liquid 
scintillators were thoroughly studied. Specifically, the potential of a FNMC to determine 
plutonium mass with neutron coincidence was evaluated. The results show that liquids 
are a strong candidate for plutonium mass characteriza ion. These measurements also 
allowed the opportunity to validate simulations performed with the MCNPX-
PoliMi/MPPost simulation tools. 
Based on the measurement results liquid scintillators appear to be a good 
candidate for a FNMC. Fast-neutron doubles rates (from multiplicity) trend linearly with 
240Pueff mass in PuO2 and MOX samples. A small four-detector system showed a 
sensitivity of 0.100 ± 0.001 neutron doubles per gram per second. Simulations of larger 
systems proved that the sensitivity can increase up to values such as 25.30 ± 2.08 with 
increased detector size and numbers. The measured doubles efficiency for the four-
detector system was 0.061 ± 0.001 %. 
Neutron PHDs can aid in neutron multiplicity system calibration via specific 
source type characterization (fission sources only versus fission and (α, n) sources, e.g. 
metal versus oxide). In this study measurements only inc uded PuO2, future efforts will 
include an expansion of the material types that are measured and how they fit into the 
current mass characterization method. 
The agreement between the fast-neutron measurement system’s simulation and 
experimental campaigns was less than 5% difference for the PuO2 pellets doubles rates 
and ~15% difference for the MOX samples doubles rates. Neutron pulse-height analysis 
had good agreements for 252Cf (a commonly used validation source) and the PuO2 pellets 
at 6.8 and 10.6% error, respectively. These results validate the use of the MCNPX-
PoliMi/MPPost package for designing a FNMC. Both the simulated and measured data fit 
well to linear trends. The quality of the linear fits to both simulated and measured data 
validate using neutron doubles rates per gram of 240Pueff to design a sensitive system and 
potentially quantify mass in a FNMC for materials of low multiplication. 
Simulation efforts to design a full FNMC show that high levels of efficiency, 
sensitivity, and expedient measurement times can be achieved by increasing the number 
of detectors and the overall detection volume. The c allenge then is balancing the 
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sensitivity and efficiency with practical size, electronics, and cross-talk. With a list of 
candidate designs, bench-top measurements were perform d at UM to work towards a 
prototype configuration. The prototype system described in Chapter 8 will demonstrate 
an advanced level of PSD abilities in a large scale system that can quickly quantify small 
amounts of plutonium mass (on the order of grams to tens of grams) with acceptable 
levels of uncertainty. 
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Chapter 8. Towards a Fast-Neutron-Multiplicity Counter Prototy pe 
Advancements in nuclear safeguards equipment should consider non-traditional 
neutron detectors to replace and potentially improve capabilities of current safeguards 
systems. A fast-neutron multiplicity counter (FNMC) that utilizes neutron elastic 
scattering for fast-neutron detection has been developed at the UM using the MCNPX-
PoliMi simulation code. The use of detectors based on fast neutron scattering allows for 
accurate neutron timing and energy information. These additional capabilities can prove 
useful in addition to neutron-multiplicity information. A prototype detector system was 
built and underwent preliminary proof-of-concept tests using well-characterized 
plutonium samples and 252Cf sources. Simulation results and initial benchmark-
measurement results are compared in detail to demonstrate the potential of an FNMC 
made of liquid scintillators in the determination of plutonium mass. Preliminary 
measurement results also help characterize the accuracy of using FNMC neutron doubles 
and triples to characterize plutonium mass. 
Two sets of measurements were performed with the FNMC prototype: 252Cf tests 
at the UM DNNG laboratory and plutonium tests at the JRC Ispra laboratory. Section 8.1 
describes the final prototype, subsequent sections review the results from the two 
mentioned measurement campaigns, and the Chapter will wrap-up with a conclusion on 
the potential of FNMCs with organic scintillators and suggestions for a more stable and 
accurate prototype design. 
8.1. FNMC Prototype 
Detectors available at the UM DNNG laboratory include sixteen 7.62 cm ø by 
7.62 cm EJ-309 liquid scintillators. As discussed in Ch. 7, these detectors are ideal for 
simultaneous detection of fast neutrons and photons (excellent PSD) and are good 
candidates for an FNMC prototype. Figure 8-1 shows the two rings of eight detectors that 
were chosen to test a full FNMC. An aluminum structure was designed to hold the 
sixteen detectors using minimal structure material to minimize unwanted neutron 
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scattering. Aluminum was chosen as it is reasonably transparent to neutrons. The two 
detector rings were placed as close together as feasibl , in order to maximize system 
efficiency by minimizing neutron loss. The detector structure was designed for an FNMC 
that has a sample cavity 40 cm in diameter. There is some flexibility in the structure, 
allowing 34 cm to 44 cm cavities, and 34 cm was used to boost efficiency once more. 
Two time-synchronized CAEN V1720, 12-bit, 250-MHz, and 8-channel digitizers were 
used to acquire individual pulse waveforms for each of the sixteen detectors (Fig. 8-2). 
The detectors were gain matched with the 137Cs Compton edge at 0.3 V (corresponding to 
478 keVee) and the detection threshold was placed at 0.0439 V for all detectors, shown in 
Fig. 8-3. These settings provided a dynamic range of 0.07 – 3.12 MeVee (approximately 
0.65 – 6.6 MeV neutron energy deposited). Bare measur ments and measurements with 1 
cm of lead were performed. Bare measurements are possible with the FNMC, although 
the addition of lead greatly decreases the severity of photon misclassification and 
therefore the final system includes 1 cm of lead. The neutron detection efficiency of the 
FNMC is slightly decreased with the addition of shield ng. Therefore the specific 
application of the system can dictate what is more important between the slight change in 
neutron detection efficiency and photon misclassification. 
 
(a)      (b) 
Fig. 8-1. Measurements with the FNMC prototype, including two rings of eight 7.62 cm ø by 
7.62 cm EJ-309 liquid scintillators, a) a bare 252Cf fission source, and b) a bare 137Cs photon 
source in the UM laboratory. 
 
Fig. 8-2. Two CAEN V1720 12-bit, 250 MHz, 8-channel time-synchronized digitizers are 




Fig. 8-3. Compton edge matching at 0.3 V for 100,00 photon pulses from all sixteen EJ-309 
detectors with 0.0439 V (70 keVee) thresholds. 
8.2. Initial 252Cf Measurement and Simulation Benchmark Tests 
Two 252Cf sources were measured at UM for initial testing of the FNMC 
prototype as well as the first step of simulation validation. The two sources have 
activities of 4.7 (252Cf #1) and 50.2 (252Cf #2) µCi, respectively, resulting in 
approximately an order of magnitude difference in neutron output (20,000 versus 216,000 
neutrons per second), which proved convenient for testing the system at different count 
rates. To further push the acquisition system and measurement analysis algorithms, a 95 
µCi 137Cs source was added to the 4.7 µCi 252Cf source, testing the data-throughput limits 
of the data-acquisition system and studying the effct of a higher photon-to-neutron 
detection ratio on the data analysis. Lastly, a long background measurement was 
performed to assess the effect of the neutron background on multiplicity. All 
measurements were performed bare and a 70-keVee thrshold was applied in the data 
processing. The measured neutron multiplicity for the mentioned measurement cases are 
show in Fig. 8-4. Measurement scenarios including the two 252Cf sources were simulated 
for comparison. 
The logarithmic scale used in Fig. 8-4 shows the vast r nge between the various 
measurements and each order of multiplicity. The multiplicity results for the two 252Cf 
sources are an order of magnitude different as expected based on their source strengths. 
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Discussions follow on the effect of the background and the effect of the PSD 
performance on the measurements of 137Cs alone and in combination with 252Cf. 
 
Fig. 8-4. Measured neutron multiplicity for measurements of 252Cf #1, 252Cf #2, 252Cf #1 and 
137Cs, 137Cs alone, and the UM laboratory background. 
8.2.1. The FNMC’s Response to Background Radiation 
In the UM measurement laboratory, a thirteen hour background measurement was 
performed to determine the abundance of neutrons in the background and their 
contribution to accidental events. Figure 8-5a shows the total photon and neutron PHDs 
from all sixteen liquid scintillators. The photon PHD has two visible Compton edges 
from 40K (1.24 MeVee edge from the 1.46 MeV photons) and 228Th (2.38 MeVee edge 
from the 2.61 MeV photons). The total photon background rate was 1440 counts per 
second (90 counts per second per detector) and the total neutron background rate was 6 
counts per second (only approximately 20 counts per minute per detector). Figure 8-5b 
shows the neutron multiplicity results from the measurement data. In this environment 
the neutron background was very small and does not have a significant effect on the 
neutron multiplicity. The background neutron doubles are only 0.7% of the doubles 





(a)      (b) 
Fig. 8-5. a) Photon and neutron PHDs for all 16 liquid scintillators and b) neutron-
multiplicity results from a 13-hour background measurement. 
8.2.2. FNMC PSD Performance 
To test the PSD capabilities of the system two measur ments were performed: a 
95 µCi 137Cs source was measured alone and in combination with the 4.7 µCi 252Cf 
source. The addition of the 137Cs to the 252Cf source increased the photon-to-neutron 
detection ratio from approximately 5 to 120. The change this addition brings to the 
neutron PHD and the neutron multiplicity reflects the effect of photon misclassification 
due to PSD. The most basic situation where photons are misclassified as neutrons is in 
the low-pulse-height area where the PSD distributions verlap. Figure 8-6 shows this 
effect where the low-pulse-height region of the PHD (less than approximately 0.3 
MeVee) shows the largest difference between the two measurement scenarios. 
The second situation where photon misclassification is common is in the cleaning 
of pulse pileup. The method of pulse-pileup cleaning employed on this data was 
described in Sect. 4.2 and uses a set fraction of the first pulse maximum to eliminate 
subsequent pulses that exceed that fraction of the pulse maximum. The scenario where 
photon/neutron misclassification is involved is when two separate photon pulses arrive 
within a single data-acquisition window and make it through the cleaning algorithm. In 
this case, the waveform is commonly classified as a neutron because the second small 
pulse increases the tail integral that is used in the digital PSD algorithm [18]. Figure 8-6 
shows evidence of this effect seen in the neutron PHD where the 137Cs Compton edge is 
visible. The pulse-pileup events result in a common Compton continuum, as it is the 
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single first detected pulse that is assessed for pulse height. This undetected pulse-pileup 
effect artificially increases the neutron count rate. 
 
(a)      (b) 
Fig. 8-6. The neutron PHDs for the measurements of 252Cf and the combination of 252Cf and 
137Cs when (a) doubles pulses at 10% of the pulse maximum and (b) 5% of the pulse 
maximum are cleaned. 
The two scenarios discussed primarily affect the neutron singles rate because 
these photons are not correlated to the 252Cf fission events. For a directly misclassified 
single photon to affect a neutron double, triple, or quadruple, it would need to arrive 
within the same 100 ns neutron multiplicity window as a detected single neutron, double 
neutron, etc.  For a photon pileup event from 137Cs to affect multiple neutron results, two 
photons would need to be detected in the same detector within approximately 10 ns of 
each other and still be within the 100 ns neutron-multiplicity window of a neutron 
detection. For these reasons, it is clear why Fig. 8-4 shows an increase in only the neutron 
singles with the addition of the 137Cs source to the 252Cf. When measuring true SNM, this 
effect would apply to photons from the background a radioactive decay, but not to 
photons from fission or (α, n) events as they are correlated in time. 
The second effect of pulse pileup on neutron-multiplicity results in a decrease of 
neutron singles, doubles, and triples rates. When t high photon rate leads to pileup 
pulses that are correctly identified, one of the contributing pulses may be a neutron, and it 
is therefore removed from the data analysis.  For the neutron singles, the previously 
described effects dominate and the neutron singles rat  shown in Fig. 8-4 increases. For 
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the remaining multiples, this second pileup effect dominates, which is evidenced in Fig. 
8-4 where the addition of the 137Cs source leads to decreased doubles, triples, and so on.  
Figure 8-7 compares the measured neutron PHD with and without the 137Cs, 
showing the fractional increase in the PHD due to the addition of the photon source. 
Figures 8-6 and 8-7 show the comparison of two double pulse cleaning fractions: 10% 
and 5%. With 10% cleaning, the 137Cs Compton edge is clearly present in the neutron 
PHD. When the severity of the cleaning is increased (a 5% cleaning fraction is used), the 
Compton edge is practically eliminated but many neutrons producing small pulses are 
also eliminated because the noise in their tail appe rs as a double pulse. When decreasing 
the pulse-pileup cleaning fraction from 10% to 5%, the amount of cleaned pulse-pileup 
waveforms increases from 0.1% to 5% of the data. There is no ideal level of pulse-pileup 
cleaning; it is a matter of determining whether neutron events can be sacrificed to ensure 
minimal photon misclassification. Many of these low pulse height waveforms that are 
wrongly eliminated are potential contributors to neutron doubles and triples events, 
therefore overly aggressive cleaning is not a solution in this application. 
 
Fig. 8-7. The fractional increase in the neutron PHD when a 137Cs source is added to a 252Cf 
measurement at two different intensities of pulse-pileup cleaning. 
The measurement of the 137Cs photon source alone can be analyzed with the PSD-
discrimination line determined for the 252Cf data. PSD-classified neutrons from the 
photon only source were used to estimate the photon misclassification frequency. The 
neutron counts include true neutrons from background radiation which were subtracted 
based on the background measurement described previously. In 1000 photon events, 
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approximately two were classified as neutrons when a 10% pulse-pileup fraction was 
used; when a 5% pulse-pileup fraction was used, only approximately one photon was 
classified as a neutron. It is important to note that t is value is only an approximation, 
especially considering photon misclassification is energy dependent and a mono-
energetic photon source was used. Photons from 137Cs are monoenergetic at 662 keV 
energy and therefore this misclassification rate obtained with 137Cs is conservative. In 
fact when measuring plutonium samples, the photon emission has a broader and higher 
energy range, as seen in Fig. 4-15.  
The effect on multiplicity of this strong photon source alone can be seen in Fig. 8-
4 which shows that misclassification of the photon s urce primarily effects the singles 
rates. This is expected as the probability of accidental coincidence events is low for the 
100 ns multiplicity window. After background subtraction, the neutron doubles rates 
from 137Cs alone are almost negligible, as they are for triples and quadruples. 
8.2.3. Simulation Validation 
The measured neutron multiplicity for the two 252Cf sources was compared to the 
simulated results. The MCNPX-PoliMi particle-transport code was used to simulate 
spontaneous fission events from 252Cf (source option “1”) and record detailed particle 
interaction information in the sixteen liquid scintillators. The MPPost data-processing 
code was used to develop the MCNPX-PoliMi output into eutron multiplicity. Figure 8-
8 shows the comparison of the measured and simulated neutron multiplicity for both 
sources. Table 8-1 summarizes the level of agreement between the measurements and 
simulations. The percent difference between the measur ment and simulations is quite 
different for the two sources and such absolute comparisons strongly depend on 
knowledge of the source strength. The known 252Cf #1 fission reaction rate is inaccurate. 
For the 252Cf #2 source, the difference between simulated and measured multiplicity is 
less than 1% for singles, -3% for doubles, and -15% for triples. This result is considered a 
very good agreement and is expected for the well-characterized 252Cf #2 source. 
Measurement times were approximately 1.5 hours, long e ough to obtain negligible 




Fig. 8-8. Measured and simulated neutron multiplicities for two 252Cf sources; statistical 
uncertainty error bars are included but appear smaller than the symbols that are used. 






n 1.00 0.75 
nn 37.03 -2.96 
nnn 49.00 -12.38 
nnnn 33.96 -27.95 
8.2.4. Bare FNMC 252Cf Neutron Multiplicity Detection Efficiency 
The absolute fission detection efficiency values for singles, doubles, and triples, 
εm for multiple m, are calculated using Eqn. 8-1. The total neutron detection efficiency, 
εtot, calculated using Eqn. 8-2.  
&M   (NM	O P ))'P(Q P  M (N)OP(Q(NM	O P QP()(PNQ 'QQ'P( R()Q      (8-1) 
&)P)   (NM	O P )) (N)OP(Q(NM	O P M')) (N)OP(Q        (8-2) 
Figure 8-9 shows the measured and simulated neutron singles, doubles, and triples 
detection efficiencies for 252Cf measured with the wo separate sources. Table 8-2 
includes the tabulated 252Cf efficiency values for the two measured and simulated cases. 
Due to the lack of significant dead time in the FNMC prototype, each detected event 
(single neutron detection or double neutron detection for example) represents a single 
fission event from the source, fission events are not expected to overlap (overlap would 




















252Cf #1 - Measurement
252Cf #1 - Simulation
252Cf #2 - Measurement
252Cf #2 - Simulation
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occur when detection rates surpassed two million counts per second). All events that are 
not cleaned from the data (approximately 95% of the data collected) are considered 
“real,” and “accidentals” do not need to be subtracted from the data.  Each detected event 
can be directly used towards determining the plutoni m mass: unfolding of moments is 
not a necessary step. 
 
(a)      (b) 
Fig. 8-9. (a) Linear and (b) logarithmic plots of the absolute detection efficiency for neutron 
singles, doubles, triples, and quadruples from 252Cf, measured and simulated for two 
sources. 
Table 8-2. Measured and simulated 252Cf fission detection efficiency for neutron singles, 














εtot 5 5 5 5 
ε1 16 17 16 17 
ε2 1 1 1 1 
ε3 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.07 
8.3. Characterizing Plutonium-Containing Materials with the FNMC Prototype 
The 252Cf tests helped to characterize the abilities and limitations of the FNMC 
prototype with a well-known fission source. To fully assess the system it was necessary 
to measure true plutonium samples as they have a number of differences from 252Cf 
which can complicate the data analysis. As described pr viously in this work, the JRC in 
Ispra has a number of well-characterized plutonium sa ples for measurement. Figure 8-
10 shows photographs of the experimental setup, which is identical to the system used at 
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the UM laboratory described earlier in the Chapter: sixteen detectors were placed around 
a 34 cm cavity. Due to the high photon emission from plutonium materials, 1 cm of lead 
shielding was used to improve PSD abilities. 
 
Fig 8-10. The sixteen-detector FNMC setup at the JRC facility in Ispra. 




















240Pueff 0.42 1.00 1.56 2.30 0.84 1.63 53.22 60.46 
234U -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.05 0.06 
235U -- -- -- -- -- -- 4.79 5.50 
236U -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.05 0.06 
238U -- -- -- -- -- -- 670.50 769.48 
238Pu 0.001 0.004 0.046 0.064 0.001 0.005 0.23 0.27 
239Pu 6.184 5.638 4.885 4.140 17.941 17.246 111.81 127.01 
240Pu 0.417 0.948 1.216 1.679 0.837 1.598 46.99 53.38 
241Pu 0.004 0.018 0.096 0.099 0.006 0.018 1.59 1.81 
242Pu 0.003 0.024 0.138 0.278 0.003 0.009 3.38 3.84 
241Am 0.018 0.064 0.343 0.369 0.048 0.180 5.20 5.91 
O 0.091 0.092 0.092 0.091 -- -- 166.22 184.00 
Total 6.716 6.787 6.816 6.719 18.836 19.056 1010.82 1151.32 
Benchmark measurements of plutonium samples with the prototype system can 
confirm the proposed data analysis capabilities and vali ate the simulation methodology. 
Three types of materials were measured: PuO2, plutonium metal (PM), and MOX. Five 
PuO2 measurements were performed with 
240Pueff masses between 0.42 and 4.29 g. Two 
PM samples were measured with 240Pueff masses of 0.84 and 1.63. Two masses of MOX 
with 53.22 and 60.46 g of 240Pueff were measured. Details of the measurement samples 
are included in Table 8-3. These samples were simulated as well as fictitious samples 
covering a range of 240Pueff mass from the measured values up to 70 g to assess th  
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evolution of the neutron singles, doubles, and triples rates across a larger range of mass. 
Summaries of the neutron emission are shown in Fig. 8-11. 
There are several challenges associated with measuring plutonium that are not 
existent with 252Cf. For example, a higher photon-to-neutron detection ratio is expected 
for any plutonium sample, plutonium isotopes have much lower fission nu-bar values, 
and PuO2 and MOX emit (α, n) neutrons. With a strong 
137Cs source added to a small 
252Cf source, a photon-to-neutron detection ratio of 120 was achieved with a bare 
measurement. This ratio is much larger for all measured plutonium sources. One cm of 
lead shielding was added to the FNMC to improve the manageability of the photon flux 
by decreasing the ratios for MOX, PuO2, and PM to approximately 25, 35, and 80 
photon-to-neutron detections. 252Cf has a very high nu-bar (an average of 3.757 neutrons 
per fission [8]) increasing the probability of doubles and triples events, while all 
plutonium isotopes emit just over 2 neutrons per spontaneous fission (2.16 for 240Pu and 
2.15 for 242Pu) [8], making doubles and triples detection less probable. Lastly, the 
addition of the (α, n) neutron source component complicates the neutron signature by 
decreasing the value of the neutron singles and adding cross talk to neutron doubles. 
Equation 8-3 defines the 240Pueff mass relative to the even plutonium isotopes 
mass, for the FNMC with 1 cm of lead shielding. The coefficients are similar to those 
defined for 3He systems that use moderation and detect thermal neutrons (Eqn. 7-1). The 
coefficients for the FNMC system were determined by simulating individual built-in 
sources (238Pu, 240Pu, and 242Pu) in MCNPX-PoliMi and comparing the detected doubles 
rates to those simulated for 240Pu. Including the 1 cm lead shield in these simulations had 
an effect on the coefficients, showing the dependence of neutron doubles on shielding 






(a)      (b) 
 
(c)      (d) 
 
(e)      (f) 
Fig. 8-11. The origin of neutron emission for a) the two MOX samples of identical isotopic 
composition, b) the two PM samples of similar isotopic composition, c) the PuO2 #1, d) the 
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8.3.1. Simulated Neutron Multiplicity 
To study the effect of 240Pueff mass on neutron singles, doubles, and triples rate, 
one PM sample (PM #2) and one PuO2 (PuO2 #4) sample were simulated with varying 
mass ranging from the true sample mass to 70 g. Figure 8-12 shows the simulated trends 
of singles, doubles, and triples rates with 240Pueff mass for PM and PuO2. The figures also 
include the same response for simulations where the mat rial matrix of the PM and PuO2 
was voided, to show the effect of matrix attenuation and multiplication. The simulations 
correspond to a six hour measurements, where negligible statistical uncertainty is seen for 
higher-order multiples, such as triples.  
 
   
Fig. 8-12. Simulated singles, doubles, and triples for fictitious PM and PuO2 samples of 
increasing 240Pueff mass and consistent isotopic composition, based onJRC standards. 
Simulated results are also included for models with voided material matrices to study the 
effect of matrix attenuation and multiplication. 
The singles trends for both materials studied are lin ar, but increase at different 
rates. The 240Pueff relationship is based on doubles and does not account f r single 
neutron sources. Therefore, a PuO2 sample with the same 
240Pueff as a PM sample is 
expected to have a larger singles rate due to the single neutron sources from (α, n) 
reactions on oxygen. The singles rates for the PuO2 with and without the material matrix 
are nearly identical while the effect of induced fission is seen in the PM. The neutron 
doubles are expected to be more similar than the singles between the two plutonium-
containing materials before effects of the material m trix come into play, because their 









































































































primary source difference is in the (α, n) neutrons that emit only one neutron. For the 
voided cases, the spontaneous fission neutron emission is similar for both cases and thus 
the doubles trends are also expected to be similar. In fact, a difference is seen between the 
two sample types due to more cross-talk events fromthe (α, n) component of the PuO2 
leading to the slightly higher voided doubles values than the PM. The effect of cross talk 
on doubles rates is dependent on the frequency of single neutron emission, which is 
elevated for the PuO2 samples with the addition of (α, n) neutrons. When the material 
matrix is taken into account, the increasing multiplication of the PM becomes apparent, 
while the PuO2 experiences the same increase on a smaller scale. At smaller masses, 
where the present studies were focused, the trend of both materials is linear and similar in 
slope.  
Triples rates can be used to study the multiplication of the sample. The triples 
immediately begin to have a non-linear trend for the PM samples and much larger rates 
than those of the PuO2 samples which have lower material multiplication. The linear 
trend of the voided simulations confirms that the quadratic shape for triples versus 240Pueff 
mass is due to multiplication. In the small samples that were studied here, matrix 
attenuation is not a dominant feature. In materials l ke MOX, this effect could be more 
prominent. 
8.3.2. PSD Performance 
The measurement system used at the JRC was described earlier in the chapter and 
was initially tested at UM with 252Cf and 137Cs. At the JRC measurements of the 
background, 252Cf, and 137Cs were repeated. The 137Cs measurement was performed to 
compare to the photon misclassification rate that ws discussed earlier in this Chapter. A 
pulse-pileup-cleaning level of 8% of the pulse heigt (between the 10% and 5% 
previously discussed) was used and the photon misclas ification rate was between 2-3 




(a)       (b) 
 
 (c)       (d) 
Fig. 8-13. Shows the optimized PSD discrimination line for 200,000 waveforms from the four 
measured material types with 1 cm of lead shielding: a) 252Cf, b) PuO2, c) PM, and d) MOX. 
PSD tail versus total integral distributions for 200,000 waveforms from 252Cf, 
PuO2, PM, and MOX are shown in Fig. 8-13. At a 70-keVee threshold (approximately 
650-keV energy deposition in the liquid scintillator), good separation is seen. Lower 
thresholds can be used with relatively good separation; a conservative value was used 
here although efficiency can be increased by decreasing the threshold. The relative 
photon-to-neutron detection ratio for each sample type can be seen by comparing the 




Tail and total integral lengths were chosen to provide optimal PSD as described in 
Sect. 4.3. The discrimination curve was determined by manually slicing the distributions 
in Fig. 8-13 perpendicularly to the neutron distribut on, using Gaussian fitting to 
determine the minimum between the two distributions, and fitting the minima to a 
polynomial. Examples of slices from a 252Cf measurement are shown in Fig. 8-14. This 
method of PSD works best if a large number of pulses are taken into consideration, so 
that slices of the distribution can be very thin resulting in more points for the polynomial 
fit. With detectors assemblies that are well gain matched, one polynomial can be used for 
all detectors. A CAEN A1536N high-voltage supply was used and the gain settings were 
stable over the five day measurement campaign. 
 
Fig. 8-14. Slices of the PSD tail versus total distributions plotted along the slice to find the 
minimum between the photon and neutron distributions. 
8.3.3. Neutron Background Detection 
Neutron detection techniques benefit from low environmental neutron background 
detection that can be misinterpreted as signal. Neutron multiplicity counters benefit to an 
even further extent considering neutron doubles, triples, etc. suffer less and less from 
neutron background as true neutron multiples are not expected. Some chance of truly 
coincident neutron multiples occur when high-energy neutrons cause spallation in high-Z 
materials. This effect is expected to be small unless arge amounts of high-Z materials are 
present. Fig. 8-15 shows the measured neutron multiplicity for a 2.5 day background 



































measurement at the JRC laboratory. For the entire FNMC prototype, only 0.03 neutron 
doubles events and 0.0001 neutron triples per second were measured. 
 
Fig. 8-15. Neutron multiplicity measured from a 2.5 day background measurement, values 
on the plot represent the singles, doubles, and triples rates from background alone. 
The weakest measured PuO2 sample (PuO2 #1) can be studied with and without a 
neutron background subtraction. Even with the small neutron emission from PuO2 #1, the 
neutron background is still small enough to have a n gligible effect on doubles and triples 
rates: it comprises 17% of singles, 3% of doubles, and 0.4% of triples. These background 
rates are slightly higher than the values measured at UM, which is expected due to the 
increase in neutron sources at the facility. The JRC laboratory is an active nuclear 
laboratory with many neutron sources in use throught the vicinity, producing a 
relatively high neutron background that compares well ith a nuclear facility that 
requires safeguarding. 
8.3.4. Measured Neutron Multiplicity and Simulation Validation 
For the nine measurement scenarios, singles, doubles, and triples rate are 
compared versus 240Pueff mass. Simulation results of these experiments are included in the 
comparison for validation and understanding of the measured results. Figure 8-16 show 
the doubles rates as a function of 240Pueff mass and is the focus of this research. Figure 8-



































(a)       (b) 
 
(c)       (d) 
 
(e)       (f) 
Fig. 8-16. Neutron singles (a and b), doubles (c and d), and triples (e and f) rates as a 
function of 240Pueff mass measured with the FNMC with 1 cm of lead shielding for three 
material types: PuO2, PM, and MOX. Two viewpoints are shown for each curve in order to 
focus in on the small PuO2 and PM samples. 





























































































































































































































The simulation multiplicity values were compared to the measured values for the 
nine plutonium measurements. The percent difference is then valuable to study to 
understand the ability of the simulation tools to accurately reproduce multiplicity results 
for SNM measured with a FNMC. Table 8-4 summarizes the percent differences seen 
between simulation and measurement results for singles, doubles, triples, and quadruples. 
As seen previously in this work the MOX measured at the JRC has questions as to its 
density and configuration within its stainless steel container; it is not a surprise that the 
disagreement is quite large, around 30% for many of the values compared. The density of 
the MOX sample will affect the neutron singles and doubles quite differently. Neutrons 
from (α, n) reactions with oxygen are a big contributor to neutrons singles events. The 
density of the sample will dictate the emission of (α, n) neutrons, leading to low neutron 
emission if the sample is either too dense (the alpha particle was stopped before finding 
oxygen) or not dense enough (the alpha particle escaped the sample before being 
stopped). Specific activity values [8] used to quantify the number of (α, n) neutrons 
created in the simulated samples are only for a specific PuO2 density and may not be 
accurate for the MOX powder sample that is measured. 
Table 8-4. The percent difference between simulated and measured neutron multiplicity for 
the nine plutonium measurement configurations and 252Cf. 
 n (%) nn (%) nnn (%) nnnn (%) 
PM #1 -49 -25 -39 -40 
PM #2 -40 -19 -17 -27 
PuO2 #1 -26 13 3 -40 
PuO2 #3 -8 7 0 -35 
PuO2 #4 -9 5 -1 6 
PuO2 #2,3 -10 2 -8 -9 
PuO2 #1,2,3 -11 0 -10 -4 
MOX #1 -21 20 24 15 
MOX #2 -26 27 51 34 
The PM samples (PM #1 and #2) also had poor absolute comparisons between 
simulation and measurement. One contribution to the disagreement is the high photon-to-
neutron detection ratio (over twice the ratio PuO2 and three times the ratio of the MOX), 
leading to more severe misclassification. Taking into account the percentage error 
expected for misclassification based on the PM’s photon-to-neutron detection ratios 
(approximately 20 %), the remaining difference is similar to the worst cases for PuO2 and 
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MOX. Next, the knowledge of sample placement within the container was not clearly 
known and therefore the placement within the cavity was far from exact and may not be 
replicated properly in simulations. However, simulation tests of small placement 
variations found this to be a small effect. 
The measured doubles data points can be fit by both linear and quadratic 
relationships for doubles rate versus 240Pueff. Both fits are shown in Fig. 8-17. From the 
simulations in Fig. 8-12, it is known that at such low mass values (less than 5g of 240Pueff) 
the trend will appear linear, but as masses continue to increase, the quadratic trend is 
apparent as previously discussed. Large enough masses to determine this quadratic trend 
were not available for measurement and therefore in order to avoid extrapolation, a linear 
fit is used. The linear and quadratic trend lines, where the doubles rate D is a function of 
240Pueff mass in grams, are defined in Eqn. 8-4 and 8-5. The composition of MOX is quite 
different than the PuO2 samples due to the significant uranium content; as a result matrix 
attenuation is more common. Such samples will requi their own calibration curve. To 
truly calibrate an FNMC system a wider range of PuO2, PM, and MOX would be 
necessary. 
 
Fig. 8-17. Linear and quadratic fits to the PuO2 doubles rate versus 
240Pueff mass data with 
R2 values of 0.9945 and 0.998 respectively. 
 
 
































^ _`aTbc de c`afg  2.51 h STUVV  _ig    (8-4) 
^ _`aTbc de c`afg  0.07 h STUVV  _ig   2.26 h STUVV  _ig  (8-5) 
The driving force for the choice of organic scintillators in a safeguards 
measurement system is the fast response of the detectors, leading to practically non-
existent accidentals counts, resulting in the ability to get good statistical uncertainty in 
small measurement times. Using the linear fit for dubles rates, the statistical uncertainty 
for doubles counts can be translated directly into 240Pueff mass. Figure 8-18 demonstrates 
the measurement times that would be needed to achieve s t levels of statistical 
uncertainty (5% and 10%) for 240Pueff mass. For these small masses, 10% statistical 
uncertainty can be achieved in less than one minute. Achieving 5% statistical uncertainty 
only takes a couple of minutes. When safeguarding SNM, the key is to look for the 
diversion of “significant quantities” of material. These amounts are defined as: 8 kg of 
plutonium, 25 kg of uranium-235 in highly enriched uranium, 75 kg of uranium-235 in 
natural or low enriched uranium [35]. Therefore, when measuring large plutonium 
samples, it is necessary to have very small 240Pueff mass uncertainty on the result to 
ensure a significant quantity has not been removed. Considering that the time needed to 
measure at a set level of uncertainty decreases rapidly with the increase in mass (Fig. 8-
18), materials high in mass can be measured with excell nt statistics in a very short time. 
 
Fig. 8-18. The measurement time necessary to achieve 5% and 10% uncertainty on 240Pueff 
mass determination with the FNMC prototype. 






























There is a straight-forward method to estimate the systematic error for the mass 
characterization technique developed from this set of data. Four of the five PuO2 data 
points can be used to develop the 240Pueff mass quantification curve and the fifth point can 
be used as a test to get an idea of systematic error. Figure 8-19 shows the four points used 
for the linear fit, which results in a slightly steeper slope of 2.52 neutron doubles per 
gram of 240Pueff mass, and the fifth measured point. The measured neutron doubles rate 
from the PuO2 #3 sample predicts a 
240Pueff mass of 1.49 ± 0.01 g. The true mass value is 
1.56 g, leading to a systematic error of 4.71%. 
 
Fig. 8-19. Linear fit to four of five PuO2 doubles rates versus 
240Pueff mass data points and 
the fifth point that is used for systematic uncertainty analysis. 
The best way to compare a traditional multiplicity counter to the FNMC prototype 
is to compare the uncertainty in 240Pueff mass determination for a set measurement time. 
For a solid comparison, both systems would need to measure a similar sample. A 
comparable 3He multiplicity counter would be the high-level neutron coincidence 
(HLNC) counter. The HLNC contains eighteen moderated 3He detectors and advertises 
17.8% efficiency [36]. For oxide samples of the order of grams, the HLNC counter is 
expected to quantify 240Pueff mass with 0.5% statistical uncertainty in approximately 2 
hours and 45 minutes [37]. Similarly, MOX powder samples on the order kilograms 
reaches 0.3% statistical uncertainty in approximately fifteen minutes. When studied for 
the same measurement times as the HLNC, The FNMC 240Pueff mass uncertainties were 

































0.4% and 0.3% for gram-level PuO2 and kilogram-level MOX samples respectively. The 
two systems use different detection mechanisms, shielding mediums, data analysis 
methods, and detector configurations, but perform identically with respect to statistical 
uncertainty on plutonium mass quantification.  
The samples measured at the JRC with the FNMC were also measured with the 
JRC Drum Monitor. This Drum Monitor system is not as comparable to the FNMC as the 
HLNC considering it has 148 3He tubes and a large cavity designed to fit waste drums. 
With a large number of 3He tubes and significant polyethylene shielding, the system has 
high detection efficiency. For the PuO2 #4 sample, the JRC Drum Monitor system 
achieved 0.52% statistical uncertainty on the plutoni m mass characterization performed 
in 1 hour and 40 minutes. Similarly, using the FNMC measurement, the 240Pueff mass was 
predicted with 0.56% statistical uncertainty in thesame measurement time. 
8.3.5. FNMC Detection Efficiencies 
Detection efficiency is a valuable parameter to study in order to optimize and 
improve an FNMC measurement system. It is not however very useful to directly 
compare FNMC and 3He system efficiencies, as they use their detections n different 
ways to achieve the end result: an estimate of the 240Pueff mass. For this reason, the 
approach used in Sect. 8.3.4 above was preferred. Figure 8-20 shows the absolute fission 
detection efficiency using 252Cf for the FNMC with 1 cm of lead shielding. Table 8.7 
summarizes the measured and simulated values. 
 
Fig. 8-20. The probability of a single, double, triple, or quadruple detection event per 252Cf 
fission event. 






































Table 8-7. The absolute total neutron detection efficiency and the absolute fission detection 
efficiency for singles, double, triples, and quadruples. 
252Cf εtot ε1 ε2 ε3 ε4 
Measured  
Efficiency (%) 












Increasing the efficiency of the system leads to smaller measurement times 
required for a set level of plutonium mass characteization uncertainty. There are 
numerous ways that the FNMC could be altered to increase the detection efficiency. The 
HLNC has a 17 cm diameter cavity, half the diameter of the FNMC, the FNMC detectors 
can easily move in to rapidly increase the efficieny. Adding a neutron scattering material 
between the detectors will scatter some neutrons back into the detectors that were on the 
path to escape the system. Simulations were performed placing polyethylene sheets in the 
empty space between detectors and the 252Cf neutron doubles rates increased 
approximately 20%. The measurement threshold can be lowered, down to 40 to 50 keVee 
at this point in time, while still maintaining suitable PSD for most samples. The general 
shape of the neutron PHDs can be described by exponntially decreasing curves, 
therefore a lower threshold greatly increases neutron events and consequently efficiency. 
The above suggestions could be easily implemented io the current FNMC prototype. 
8.3.6. Characterization with PHDs 
The measurements showed that different types of plutoni m-containing materials 
require different FNMC calibration curves to use both neutron doubles or triples to 
characterize 240Pueff mass. In Sect. 4.5.1 it was shown that PHDs could be used to 
characterize material types. In the FNMC, PHDs with good statistics can be collected in a 
short measurement time by combining all detector signals. Figure 8-21 shows the 
measured neutron PHDs normalized to their integral for plutonium-containing samples 
that were measured during this measurement campaign. 
The shape of the PHD could be used to determine the curve chosen to quantify the 
240Pueff from both doubles and triples rates. Isotopic neutron sources such as Am-Be and 




Fig. 8-21. Normalized PHDs for seven of the plutonium measurement configurations, 
showing oxide versus metal characterization abilities. 
8.3.7. Proposed Future Work 
As mentioned throughout this Chapter, there are numerous ways to improve the 
current prototype multiplicity system. Starting with detector system efficiency, several 
further modifications in the geometry and data acquisition can be made to increase the 
efficiency. These modifications include decreased cavity dimensions, addition of a 
scattering medium around detectors, decreased detection threshold, and optimization of 
lead shielding.  
Measurements need to be performed on a broader range of plutonium containing 
materials to fully characterize the FNMC system. Bymeasuring more well-defined 
samples the simulations can be further validated an  full calibration curve can be 
developed for both neutron doubles and triples. 
There are data analysis techniques that could be finessed to improve the accuracy 
of multiplicity results. Initially, the quality of the neutron multiplicity results relies on the 
PSD performance, as seen with the PM measurements. Basic charge integration methods 
were used here to discriminate photons and neutrons, new methods can be tailored to 
specific pulse-height regions to improve the PSD. Also, improvements in high-quality 
photomultiplier tubes, digitizer sampling frequencies, and electronic noise will have an 
impact on the performance.  Secondly, cross talk has been mentioned throughout this 









































work and has the potential to affect the ability of the system to quantify plutonium mass. 
If the neutron energy distribution among sources stays relatively constant, then the effect 
of cross talk across a range of masses is constant and only increases the system 
efficiency. However, when neutron energy distributions differ (fission neutrons versus (α,
n) neutrons for example) the contribution of cross talk to doubles and triples rates will not 
be the same. The prevalence of cross talk is energy dependent, and the probability of 
detecting the same neutron in two separate detectors inc eases with neutron energy. 
Additionally, the effect of neutron cross talk on doubles depends on the frequency of 
neutron singles events. One way to practically eliminate this issue is to reject coincidence 
events from neighboring detectors, as they are mostaffected by of cross talk events.  
Progress is being made within the DNNG to perform data analysis and mass 
determination algorithms on-the-fly with improvements in the size of FPGA’s available 
in multi-channel digitizers. Multi-trigger logic, pulse-height identification, accurate 
timing determination, and PSD are all being implemented on-board. Recently available 
digitizers and digitizer crates will allow all algorithms to be stored on the digitizer and 
time synchronization between digitizers to be inherent. With new computer connectivity 
abilities, such as USB 3.0, data transfer capabilities will increase dramatically. The 
current prototype is limited by count rates because all waveforms are transferred to the 
computer and analyzed offline. When combining on-the-fly data analysis and improved 
connectivity, count-rate limitations will not be an issue as the measurement system will 
process all relevant information directly on the digitizer’s board and will provide the 
quantities of interest. 
8.3.8. Summary and Conclusions 
A prototype fast-neutron-multiplicity counter was designed, constructed, and 
tested in two measurement campaigns. The first campaign was at UM using two 252Cf 
sources and the second at the JRC in Ispra using two plutonium metal samples, four PuO2 
samples, and two MOX samples. 
The FNMC results showed a linear trend between neutron doubles rates from 
PuO2 samples and 
240Pueff mass. By using doubles rates, 
240Pueff mass could be quantified 
to 5% uncertainty in measurement times of the order of minutes. Plutonium metal and 
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PuO2 fit on the same calibration curve for 
240Pueff masses less than 5 grams, but 
simulations show that the two types begin to separate shortly after that. Independent 
calibration curves would be needed for the two types of material and the knowledge of 
which curve to use can be learned from the shape of the neutron PHD. 
This work proves the potential of an FNMC and provides some avenues for future 
work. Throughout this work, the importance of many details became apparent in the use 
of liquid scintillators for neutron detection. Use of a digitizer with a fast enough data-
sampling frequency and vertical resolution are important to PSD. Another key aspect to 
the success of a system such as an FNMC is not only the data acquisition and analysis, 
but the choice of high quality electronics including fast and robust photo-multiplier tubes. 
These details, as well as numerous more, play a role in the successful implementation of 





Chapter 9. Summary and Conclusions 
The number and complexity of nuclear facilities are increasing and new 
technologies are needed to maintain successful international safeguards efforts. 
Specifically, new radiation measurement systems for nuclear safeguards are needed to 
provide accountability of nuclear materials in facilities around the world. Previously-
developed systems relied on 3He as the detection medium. These systems used neutro  
moderators prior to neutron detection. This thesis explores the use of fast neutron 
detectors in a new safeguards instrument: the FNMC. The use of fast neutron detectors 
such as the liquid scintillators used here provides some advantages over the previously-
used 3He detectors. 
Organic liquid scintillators are a valuable tool for studying SNM characteristics. 
They are especially compatible with neutron multiplic ty counting techniques for material 
characterization. These detectors are sensitive to neutrons at an appropriate range of 
energy for neutron detection within this application: neutrons from spontaneous and 
induced fission. The organic scintillator coupled with fast photo-multiplier tubes, 
electronics, and algorithms lead to excellent timing properties providing nanosecond 
accuracy on detection timing. Organic scintillators a e sensitive to photons, but liquids 
offer the capability to apply PSD processing techniques on measured data to distinguish 
between neutrons and photons. Alternatives to 3He multiplicity systems are being sought 
after. This work proposes an option that uses sixteen liquid scintillators and one cm of 
lead shielding to measure neutron doubles and triples to quantify 240Pueff mass. 
A number of experiments and simulations were performed to show the feasibility 
of the FNMC system. Passive neutron coincidence measur ments of plutonium were 
performed to measure correlated neutrons from spontaneous and induced fissions. Within 
this study, the detection system was able to capture he time, energy, and angular 
distributions of neutron emission from the samples. Active-interrogation methods of 
uranium characterization were investigated to determine the ability of the liquid 
scintillators to detect induced-fission neutrons in the presence of active neutron sources. 
Detection timing techniques were used to identify small differences in enrichment and 
mass. A partial FNMC system was used to perform initial tests of the multiplicity 
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sensitivity of the system to changes in 240Pueff mass. With the knowledge and tools 
developed in the measurements with the partial system, a full FNMC system was 
designed and used to quantify plutonium mass. 
In parallel to measurement campaigns the physics behind neutron detection and 
methods for data analysis were studied using MCNPX-PoliMi simulations. The 
simulations helped design measurement system geometries and predicted the success of 
chosen data analysis techniques. After measured data were collected and analyzed the 
results were used to validate the simulation methodology. Throughout this work 
simulation validations were successful in improving the simulation tools and in the end 
the simulations were used to design the full FNMC measurement system. 
An optimized and efficient FNMC was shown to be able to characterize materials 
in fast measurement times because little to no accidental counts are collected during its 
acquisition. Because each coincident detection is directly used, the efficiency of the 
system can be at a lower level and the system can still arrive at low statistical 
uncertainties on the 240Pueff in fast measurement times. The measured absolute neutro  
detection efficiency was 5.28 ± 0.06 %. The absolute fission detection efficiency for the 
neutron doubles was 1.10 ± 0.01 %. The FNMC can measur  gram levels of 240Pueff to 
5% statistical uncertainty in measurement times on the order of a couple of minutes. The 
presented FNMC could produce a system that would meet and exceed the performance of 





Appendix A – MCNPX-PoliMi Input Files 
FNMC PuO2 Simulation 
c DNNG: CBNM1 (70) 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c  Cells 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c   EJ-309 Detectors 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  101   1  -0.957    -11           imp:N,P=1   $ detector 
  102   1  -0.957    -12           imp:N,P=1   $ detector 
  103   1  -0.957    -13           imp:N,P=1   $ detector 
  104   1  -0.957    -14           imp:N,P=1   $ detector 
  105   1  -0.957    -15           imp:N,P=1   $ detector 
  106   1  -0.957    -16           imp:N,P=1   $ detector 
  107   1  -0.957    -17           imp:N,P=1   $ detector 
  108   1  -0.957    -18           imp:N,P=1   $ detector 
  109   1  -0.957    -19           imp:N,P=1   $ detector 
  110   1  -0.957    -20           imp:N,P=1   $ detector 
  111   1  -0.957    -21           imp:N,P=1   $ detector 
  112   1  -0.957    -22           imp:N,P=1   $ detector 
  113   1  -0.957    -23           imp:N,P=1   $ detector 
  114   1  -0.957    -24           imp:N,P=1   $ detector 
  115   1  -0.957    -25           imp:N,P=1   $ detector 
  116   1  -0.957    -26           imp:N,P=1   $ detector 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c   Table 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  201   5  -2.7      -31           imp:n,p=1   $ Surface 
  206   5  -2.7      -32           imp:n,p=1   $ Support 
  207   5  -2.7      -33           imp:n,p=1   $ Support 
  208   5  -2.7      -34           imp:n,p=1   $ Support 
  209   5  -2.7      -35           imp:n,p=1   $ Support 
  215   5  -2.7      -36           imp:n,p=1   $ Leg  
  216   5  -2.7      -37           imp:n,p=1   $ Leg  
  218   5  -2.7      -38           imp:n,p=1   $ Leg 
  219   5  -2.7      -39           imp:n,p=1   $ Leg  
  220   5  -2.7      -40           imp:n,p=1   $ Leg  
  221   5  -2.7      -41           imp:n,p=1   $ Leg 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c   Detector Structure 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  300   5  -2.7      -90 11 19     imp:N,P=1   $front plate 
  301   5  -2.7      -91 11 19     imp:N,P=1   $back plate 
  302   5  -2.7      -92 12 20     imp:N,P=1   $front plate 
  303   5  -2.7      -93 12 20     imp:N,P=1   $back plate 
  304   5  -2.7      -94 13 21     imp:N,P=1   $front plate 
  305   5  -2.7      -95 13 21     imp:N,P=1   $back plate 
  306   5  -2.7      -96 14 22     imp:N,P=1   $front plate 
  307   5  -2.7      -97 14 22     imp:N,P=1   $back plate 
  308   5  -2.7      -98 15 23     imp:N,P=1   $front plate 
  309   5  -2.7      -99 15 23     imp:N,P=1   $back plate 
  310   5  -2.7     -100 16 24     imp:N,P=1   $front plate 
  311   5  -2.7     -101 16 24     imp:N,P=1   $back plate 
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  312   5  -2.7     -102 17 25     imp:N,P=1   $front plate 
  313   5  -2.7     -103 17 25     imp:N,P=1   $back plate 
  314   5  -2.7     -104 18 26     imp:N,P=1   $front plate 
  315   5  -2.7     -105 18 26     imp:N,P=1   $back plate 
  316   5  -2.7 -106:-108:-110:-112: 
                -114:-116:-118:-120 imp:N,P=1  $bottom bar 
  317   5  -2.7 -107:-109:-111:-113: 
                -115:-117:-119:-121 imp:N,P=1  $top bar 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c   Lead Shielding 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  501   3 -11.34     -51 52 -53 54 imp:N,P=1   $lead shield 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c Ground 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  
  601   6  -2.3      -500 -61      imp:N,P=1   $concrete floor 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c   PuO2 Source 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  701   7  -10.94    -71            imp:n,p=1  $PuO2 Sample 
  702   8  -7.92     -72            imp:n,p=1  $Source stand 
  703   8  -7.92     -73 74         imp:n,p=1  $Source stand 
  704   8  -7.92     -75            imp:n,p=1  $Source stand 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c  Environment 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  901   2  -1.205E-3 -500 61 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
              21 22 23 24 25 26 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 
              39 40 41 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100  
              101 102 103 104 105 71 72 75  
               #703 #316 #317 #501 imp:N,P=1 
  999   0     500                  imp:N,P=0 
 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c  Surfaces 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  
c   EJ-309 Detectors 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  11   RCC    16.92         0   5.31    7.6200         0  0    3.8100 
  12 1 RCC    16.92         0   5.31    7.6200         0  0    3.8100 
  13 2 RCC    16.92         0   5.31    7.6200         0  0    3.8100 
  14 3 RCC    16.92         0   5.31    7.6200         0  0    3.8100 
  15 4 RCC    16.92         0   5.31    7.6200         0  0    3.8100 
  16 5 RCC    16.92         0   5.31    7.6200         0  0    3.8100 
  17 6 RCC    16.92         0   5.31    7.6200         0  0    3.8100 
  18 7 RCC    16.92         0   5.31    7.6200         0  0    3.8100 
  19   RCC    16.92         0  -5.31    7.6200         0  0    3.8100 
  20 1 RCC    16.92         0  -5.31    7.6200         0  0    3.8100 
  21 2 RCC    16.92         0  -5.31    7.6200         0  0    3.8100 
  22 3 RCC    16.92         0  -5.31    7.6200         0  0    3.8100 
  23 4 RCC    16.92         0  -5.31    7.6200         0  0    3.8100 
  24 5 RCC    16.92         0  -5.31    7.6200         0  0    3.8100 
  25 6 RCC    16.92         0  -5.31    7.6200         0  0    3.8100 
  26 7 RCC    16.92         0  -5.31    7.6200         0  0    3.8100 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 




  31 8 BOX  -50  -100   -0.5   100   0 0    0 200   0   0 0   0.5   
  32 8 BOX  -50  -100   -4.9     4.4 0 0    0 200   0   0 0   4.4    
  33 8 BOX  45.6 -100   -4.9     4.4 0 0    0 200   0   0 0   4.4 
  34 8 BOX -45.6 -100   -4.9    91.2 0 0    0   4.4 0   0 0   4.4 
  35 8 BOX -45.6   95.6 -4.9    91.2 0 0    0   4.4 0   0 0   4.4 
  36 8 BOX -50     -2.2 -4.9     4.4 0 0    0   4.4 0   0 0 -85.5 
  37 8 BOX  45.6   -2.2 -4.9     4.4 0 0    0   4.4 0   0 0 -85.5 
  38 8 BOX -50   -100   -4.9     4.4 0 0    0   4.4 0   0 0 -85.5  
  39 8 BOX  45.6 -100   -4.9     4.4 0 0    0   4.4 0   0 0 -85.5  
  40 8 BOX -50     95.6 -4.9     4.4 0 0    0   4.4 0   0 0 -85.5  
  41 8 BOX  45.6   95.6 -4.9     4.4 0 0    0   4.4 0   0 0 -85.5  
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c   Lead Shielding 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  51   CZ   6.5        $outer cylinder 
  52   CZ   5.5        $inner cylinder 
  53   PZ   15.25      $top 
  54   PZ  -16.25      $bottom 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c Ground 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  
  61 PZ     -108   $ Floor level 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  
c CBNM 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  
  71  RCC  0 0 -0.21   0 0 0.364  0.73 
  72  RCC  0 0 -0.25   0 0 0.02   4.5 
  73  RCC  0 0 -16.25  0 0 16     3 
  74  RCC  0 0 -16.25  0 0 16     2.8 
  75  RCC  0 0 -17.25  0 0 1      8.5 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c  Detector Structure 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  90 RPP  22 22.3175   -5.05     5.05   -17.25  13.35  
  91 RPP 24.2225 24.54 -5.05     5.05   -17.25  13.35  
  92 1 RPP 22 22.3175  -5.05     5.05   -17.25  13.35  
  93 1 RPP 24.2225 24.54 -5.05   5.05   -17.25  13.35  
  94 2 RPP 22 22.3175  -5.05     5.05   -17.25  13.35 
  95 2 RPP 24.2225 24.54 -5.05   5.05   -17.25  13.35 
  96 3 RPP 22 22.3175  -5.05     5.05   -17.25  13.35 
  97 3 RPP 24.2225 24.54 -5.05   5.05   -17.25  13.35  
  98 4 RPP 22 22.3175 -5.05      5.05   -17.25  13.35  
  99 4 RPP 24.2225 24.54 -5.05   5.05   -17.25  13.35  
 100 5 RPP 22 22.3175 -5.05      5.05   -17.25  13.35  
 101 5 RPP 24.2225 24.54 -5.05   5.05   -17.25  13.35  
 102 6 RPP 22 22.3175  -5.05     5.05   -17.25  13.35  
 103 6 RPP 24.2225 24.54 -5.05  5.05   -17.25  13.35   
 104 7 RPP 22 22.3175 -5.05     5.05   -17.25  13.35   
 105 7 RPP 24.2225 24.5 -5.05   5.05   -17.25  13.35   
 106   RPP  22.3176 24.2224   -10.0333 10.0333 -17.25 -15.345  
 107   RPP  22.3176 24.2224   -10.0333 10.0333  11.445 13.35   
 108 1 RPP  22.3176 24.2224   -10.0333 10.0333 -17.25 -15.345  
 109 1 RPP  22.3176 24.2224   -10.0333 10.0333  11.445 13.35   
 110 2 RPP  22.3176 24.2224   -10.0333 10.0333 -17.25 -15.345   
 111 2 RPP  22.3176 24.2224   -10.0333 10.0333  11.445 13.35    
 112 3 RPP  22.3176 24.2224   -10.0333 10.0333 -17.25 -15.345 
 113 3 RPP  22.3176 24.2224   -10.0333 10.0333  11.445 13.35  
109 
 
 114 4 RPP  22.3176 24.2224   -10.0333 10.0333 -17.25 -15.345  
 115 4 RPP  22.3176 24.2224   -10.0333 10.0333  11.445 13.35   
 116 5 RPP  22.3176 24.2224   -10.0333 10.0333 -17.25 -15.345  
 117 5 RPP  22.3176 24.2224   -10.0333 10.0333  11.445 13.35   
 118 6 RPP  22.3176 24.2224   -10.0333 10.0333 -17.25 -15.345  
 119 6 RPP  22.3176 24.2224   -10.0333 10.0333  11.445 13.35   
 120 7 RPP  22.3176 24.2224   -10.0333 10.0333 -17.25 -15.345  
 121 7 RPP  22.3176 24.2224   -10.0333 10.0333  11.445 13.35   
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c  Environment 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 







  TR1  0 0 0   0.7071  0.7071  0   -0.7071  0.7071  0   0  0  1 
  TR2  0 0 0   0       1       0   -1       0       0   0  0  1 
  TR3  0 0 0  -0.7071  0.7071  0   -0.7071 -0.7071  0   0  0  1 
  TR4  0 0 0  -1       0       0    0      -1       0   0  0  1 
  TR5  0 0 0  -0.7071 -0.7071  0    0.7071 -0.7071  0   0  0  1 
  TR6  0 0 0   0      -1       0    1       0       0   0  0  1 
  TR7  0 0 0   0.7071 -0.7071  0    0.7071  0.7071  0   0  0  1 




  MODE n p 
  PHYS:N J 20 
  PHYS:P 0 1 1 




  SDEF cel=701 pos=0 0 -0.21 axs=0 0 1 rad=d1 ext=d2 erg=d3 
  SC1  Source radius (inner outer) 
  SI1  0 0.73 
  SC2  Source height 
  SI2  0 0.364 
  SI3  L 3 4 38 39 40 41 
  SP3  0.2230 0.0430 0.2372 0.0723 0.0666 0.3579 
  IPOL  99 1 2 1 J 1 16 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 
        109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 
  NPS 4635000 $ 9270000 = Number of reactions in 3600 sec (aged CBNM) 
  FILES 21 DUMN1 
  DBCN 




c  EJ-309 liquid scintillator 
c (Eljen Technologies, EJ-309 Fact Sheet) 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  m1   nlib=60c  plib=04p 
       1001      0.548           
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       6000      0.452           
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c Air, Dry (near sea level) d=-1.205E-3 
c (Mat. Compendium PNNL) 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  m2  nlib=60c  plib=04p 
      6000     -0.000124 
      7014     -0.755268 
      8016     -0.231781 
     18000.42c -0.012827 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c  Lead Shielding d=-11.34 
c  
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  m3  82000.42c 1 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c Polyethylene d=-0.9300 
c (Mat. Compendium PNNL) 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  m4  nlib=60c  plib=04p 
      1001 -0.143716 
      6000 -0.856284 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c Aluminum table d=-2.70 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  m5  nlib=60c  plib=04p 
     13027     -1 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c Concrete (Mat. Compendium PNNL) d=-2.3 
c (Mat. Compendium PNNL) 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  m6  nlib=60c  plib=04p 
      1001     -0.022100 
      6000     -0.002484 
      8016     -0.574930 
     11023     -0.015208 
     12000     -0.001266 
     13027     -0.019953 
     14000     -0.304627 
     19000     -0.010045 
     20000     -0.042951 
     26000.42c -0.006435 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c  PuO2 CBNM Sample d=-10.94 
c (CBNM-70) 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  m7  94238.42c   -0.00669 
      94239.60c   -0.71672    
      94240.60c   -0.17839  
      94241.60c   -0.01412   
      94242.60c   -0.02031    
      95241.61c   -0.05027 
      08016.60c   -0.01350 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c Steel d=-7.92 




  m8  26000.55c -0.6950 
      24000.50c -0.1900 
      28000.50c -0.0950 
      25055.51c  -0.0200 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 




c  F31:n 11.3 12.3 13.3 14.3 15.3 16.3 17.3 18.3 19.3 
c  E31 0 0.5 0.7 29i 1 899i 10 100 
c  C31 0 1 
c  F41:p 11.3 
c  E41 0 999i 10 






Ispra PuO2 Pellet Simulations with the Partial FNMC 
c DNNG: Measurement 1 PuO2 pellets 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c  Cells 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c   EJ-309 Detectors 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  101   1  -0.916    -11           imp:N,P=1   $ detector 
  102   1  -0.916    -12           imp:N,P=1   $ detector 
  103   1  -0.916    -13           imp:N,P=1   $ detector 
  104   1  -0.916    -14           imp:N,P=1   $ detector 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c Tables 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  
  201   5  -2.7      -21  imp:N,P=1   $ Aluminum surface 
  202   5  -2.7      -22  imp:N,P=1   $ Aluminum rectangular support  
  203   5  -2.7      -23  imp:N,P=1   $ Aluminum rectangular support 
  204   5  -2.7      -24  imp:N,P=1   $ Aluminum rectangular support 
  205   5  -2.7      -25  imp:N,P=1   $ Aluminum rectangular support 
  206   5  -2.7      -26  imp:N,P=1   $ Aluminum support, PMT and table 
  207   5  -2.7      -27  imp:N,P=1   $ Aluminum support, PMT and table 
  208   5  -2.7      -28  imp:N,P=1   $ Aluminum surface, source table 
  209   5  -2.7      -29  imp:N,P=1   $ Aluminum rectangular support 
  210   5  -2.7      -30  imp:N,P=1   $ Aluminum rectangular support 
  211   5  -2.7      -31  imp:N,P=1   $ Aluminum rectangular support 
  212   5  -2.7      -32  imp:N,P=1   $ Aluminum rectangular support 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c Ground 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  
  401   6  -2.3      -91 -41       imp:N,P=1   $ concrete floor 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c   Lead Shielding 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  501   3  -11.34 -51 52 53 -54 55 imp:N,P=1   $lead shield 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c  PuO2 pellets and containers 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  701   7  -4.27   -71             imp:N,P=1   $pellet #6 
  702   7  -4.25   -72             imp:N,P=1   $pellet #7 
  703   7  -4.23   -73             imp:N,P=1   $pellet #8 
  704   7  -4.26   -74             imp:N,P=1   $pellet #9 
  705   7  -4.26   -75             imp:N,P=1   $pellet #10 
  706   7  -5.35   -76             imp:N,P=1   $pellet #20 
  707   7  -5.70   -77             imp:N,P=1   $pellet #21 
  708   7  -5.70   -78             imp:N,P=1   $pellet #22 
  709   8  -5.24   -79             imp:N,P=1   $pellet #30 
  801   9  -7.92   -81 71          imp:N,P=1   $container #6 
  802   9  -7.92   -82 72          imp:N,P=1   $container #7 
  803   9  -7.92   -83 73          imp:N,P=1   $container #8 
  804   9  -7.92   -84 74          imp:N,P=1   $container #9 
  805   9  -7.92   -85 75          imp:N,P=1   $container #10 
  806   9  -7.92   -86 76          imp:N,P=1   $container #20 
  807   9  -7.92   -87 77          imp:N,P=1   $container #21 
  808   9  -7.92   -88 78          imp:N,P=1   $container #22 




c  Environment 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  901   2  -1.205E-3 -91 #501  41  
             11 12 13 14 21 22 23 
             24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
             31 32 81 82 83 84 85  
             86 87 88 89           imp:N,P=1 
  999   0    91                    imp:N,P=0 
 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c  Surfaces 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  
c  EJ-309 Detectors 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  11 1 RCC      20  0  0    7.62  0  0    3.81 
  12 2 RCC      20  0  0    7.62  0  0    3.81 
  13 3 RCC      20  0  0    7.62  0  0    3.81 
  14 4 RCC      20  0  0    7.62  0  0    3.81 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c Tables 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  
  21 RPP -47.5  47.5 8.45  53.95   -17    -15.5   $ Aluminum surface on 
the  
  22 RPP -57    47.5 8.45  12.95   -21.5  -17.01  $ Aluminum 
rectangular  
  23 RPP -57    47.5 49.45  53.95   -21.5  -17.01  $ Aluminum 
rectangular  
  24 RPP -57   -52.5 12.96  49.44   -21.5  -17.01  $ Aluminum 
rectangular  
  25 RPP  43.5  47.5 12.96  49.44   -21.5  -17.01  $ Aluminum 
rectangular  
  26 RPP -47.5  47.5 31.2   40.2    -15.49 -11     $ Aluminum 
rectangular  
  27 RPP -47.5  47.5 35.7   40.2    -10.99  -2     $ Aluminum 
rectangular  
  28 RPP -82.5  82.5 -42.55   7.45   -21    -20.6  $ Aluminum surface 
  29 RPP -82.5  82.5 -42.55 -38.05   -25.5  -21.01 $ Aluminum 
  30 RPP -82.5  82.5  2.95   7.45   -25.5  -21.01  $ Aluminum 
  31 RPP -82.5 -78 -38.04   2.94   -25.5  -21.01   $ Aluminum  
  32 RPP  78  82.5 -38.04  2.94   -25.5  -21.01    $ Aluminum  
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c Ground 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  
  41 PZ     -99   $ Floor level 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c   Lead Shielding 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  51 5 CZ   20 
  52 5 CZ   19.75 
  53   PZ  -5 
  54   PZ   5 
  55   PY   7 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  
c PuO2 Pellets 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  
  71   RCC   1.768 -1.768 -0.75  0 0 0.4   0.7 
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  72   RCC   2.5    0     -0.75  0 0 0.4   0.7 
  73   RCC   1.768  1.768 -0.75  0 0 0.4   0.7 
  74   RCC   0      2.5   -0.75  0 0 0.4   0.7 
  75   RCC  -1.768  1.768 -0.75  0 0 0.4   0.7 
  76   RCC  -2.5    0     -0.9   0 0 0.8   0.7 
  77   RCC  -1.768 -1.768 -1.0   0 0 1.5   0.7 
  78   RCC   0     -2.5   -1.3   0 0 3.0   0.7 
  79   RCC   0      0     -1.7   0 0 3.4   0.7 
  81   RCC   1.768 -1.768 -6.8   0 0 7.95  0.75 
  82   RCC   2.5    0     -6.8   0 0 7.95  0.75 
  83   RCC   1.768  1.768 -6.8   0 0 7.95  0.75 
  84   RCC   0      2.5   -6.8   0 0 7.95  0.75 
  85   RCC  -1.768  1.768 -6.8   0 0 7.95  0.75 
  86   RCC  -2.5    0     -6.8   0 0 8.2   0.75 
  87   RCC  -1.768 -1.768 -6.8   0 0 8.8   0.75 
  88   RCC   0     -2.5   -6.8   0 0 10    0.75 
  89   RCC   0      0     -6.8   0 0 10    0.75 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c  Environment 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 







  TR1  0 0 0   0.815 0.5790 0   -0.5790  0.815 0   0 0 1 
  TR2  0 0 0   0.313 0.9499 0   -0.9499  0.313 0   0 0 1 
  TR3  0 0 0  -0.313 0.9499 0   -0.9499 -0.313 0   0 0 1 
  TR4  0 0 0  -0.815 0.5790 0   -0.5790 -0.815 0   0 0 1 




  MODE n p 
  PHYS:N J 20 
  PHYS:P 0 1 1 




  SDEF pos=0 0 -1.7 axs=0 0 1 rad=D1 ext=D2 erg=D5 cel=D6 eff=1e-4 
  SC1  Source radius (inner outer) 
  SI1  0 3.2 
  SC2  Source height 
  SI2  0 3.4 
  SI5  L 3      4      -38    -39    -40    -41 
  SP5    0.3782 0.0235 0.0403 0.1418 0.1129 0.3033 
  SI6  L 701   702   703   704   705   706   707   708   709 
  SP6    0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.060 0.120 0.240 0.460 
  IPOL  99 1 2 1 J 1 4 101 102 103 104 
  NPS 1.26585E7 $ 14065 rxn/sec, 1 hour meas is 50634000, use 4 seeds 
  FILES 21 DUMN1 
  DBCN 






c  EJ-309 liquid scintillator  
c (Eljen Technologies, EJ-309 Fact Sheet) 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  m1   nlib=60c  plib=04p 
       1001      0.548           
       6000      0.452           
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c Air, Dry (near sea level) d=-1.205E-3 
c (Mat. Compendium PNNL) 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  m2  nlib=60c  plib=04p 
      6000     -0.000124 
      7014     -0.755268 
      8016     -0.231781 
     18000.42c -0.012827 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c  Lead Shielding d=-11.34 
c  
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  m3  82000.42c 1 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c Polyethylene d=-0.9300 
c (Mat. Compendium PNNL) 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  m4  nlib=60c  plib=04p 
      1001 -0.143716 
      6000 -0.856284 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c Aluminum table d=-2.70 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  m5  nlib=60c  plib=04p 
     13027     -1 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c Concrete (Mat. Compendium PNNL) d=-2.3 
c (Mat. Compendium PNNL) 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  m6  nlib=60c  plib=04p 
      1001     -0.022100 
      6000     -0.002484 
      8016     -0.574930 
     11023     -0.015208 
     12000     -0.001266 
     13027     -0.019953 
     14000     -0.304627 
     19000     -0.010045 
     20000     -0.042951 
     26000.42c -0.006435 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c  PuO2 pellets 6,7,8,9,10,20,21,22 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  m7  8016.60c    -0.1174   
      94238.42c   -0.0005    
      94239.60c   -0.7466    
      94240.60c   -0.1151  
      94241.60c   -0.0027   
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      94242.60c   -0.0023    
      95241.61c   -0.0153 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c  PuO2 pellet 30 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  m8  8016.60c    -0.1164   
      94238.42c   -0.0007    
      94239.60c   -0.6026    
      94240.60c   -0.2282  
      94241.60c   -0.0057   
      94242.60c   -0.0124    
      95241.61c   -0.0340 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c    Steel 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
  m9  26000.55c -0.6950 
      24000.50c -0.1900 
      28000.50c -0.0950 
      25055.51c  -0.0200 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 




  F31:n 11.3 12.3 13.3 14.3 
  E31 0 0.5 0.7 29i 1 899i 10 100 








Ispra Mixed-Oxide Fuel Example 
Detailed Ispra Model Setup 
c 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 




c   MOX Source 2 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
601     0          -73 87 -82     imp:n,p=1 $vacuum on top of powder 
602     1   -0.7   -73 81 -87     imp:n,p=1 $MOX powder 
603     10  -7.92   73 -74 81 -82 imp:n,p=1 $inner steel cylinder 
604     10  -7.92  -74 80 -81     imp:n,p=1 $steel inner bottom 
605     10  -7.92  -74 82 -83     imp:n,p=1 $steel inner top 
606     0           74 -75 80 -83 imp:n,p=1 $surrounding vacuum 
cylinder 
607     0          -75 79 -80     imp:n,p=1 $bottom vacuum 
608     0          -75 83 -84     imp:n,p=1 $top vacuum 
609     0          -72 84 -85     imp:n,p=1 $another top vacuum 
610     10  -7.92   75 -76 79 -84 imp:n,p=1 $outer steel cylinder 
611     10  -7.92  -76 89 -79     imp:n,p=1 $steel outer bottom 
612     10  -7.92   72 -77 84 -85 imp:n,p=1 $steel cylinder top 
613     10  -7.92  -77 85 -86     imp:n,p=1 $steel outer top 
614     0          -71 88 -89     imp:n,p=1 $vacuum inside al-support 
615     0           71 -72 88 -89 imp:n,p=1 $Al cylindrical support 
c 
c   EJ-309 Detector 1 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
1      2   -2.70     1 -2  -9         imp:N,P=1      $ Al endcap 
3      2   -2.70     2 -32  8  -9     imp:N,P=1      $ Al external wall 
4      2   -2.70     3 -5   9  -12    imp:N,P=1      $ Al wall 
c 5    6   -0.001    2 -3   7  -8     imp:N,P=1      $ nitrogen chamber 
6      5   -0.916    2 -32  -8        imp:N,P=1      $ detector 
7      7   -2.23     32 -5  -9        imp:N,P=1      $ pyrex window 
8      2   -2.70     4 -14  12 -13    imp:N,P=1      $ Al ring 
9      2   -0.001    5 -31 -10        imp:N,P=1      $ PMT big 
10     4   -0.001    5 -31  10 -11    imp:N,P=1      $ air around PMT 
11     8   -8.747    5 -21  11 -12    imp:N,P=1      $ mu metal wall 
18     2   -0.001   31 -27 -34        imp:N,P=1      $ PMT small 
19     4   -0.001   31 -21  19 -11    imp:N,P=1      $ air around PMT 
21     8   -8.747   15 -27  19 -20    imp:N,P=1      $ mu metal wall 
22     4   -0.001   21 -27  34 -19    imp:N,P=1      $ air around PMT 
13     4   -0.001   27 -17 -19        imp:N,P=1      $ air/Al in tube 
14     2   -2.70    16 -27  20 -35    imp:N,P=1      $ Al wall 
23     2   -2.70    27 -17  19 -35    imp:N,P=1      $ Al wall 
15     2   -2.70    17 -18 -35        imp:N,P=1      $ Al endcap 
16     4   -0.001   21 -15  19 -28    imp:N,P=1      $ air around PMT 
17     8   -8.747   21 -15  19  28 -29 imp:N,P=1     $ mu metal wall 
c 
c   EJ-309 Detector 2 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
101 like 1 but trcl=2 
103 like 3 but trcl=2 
104 like 4 but trcl=2 
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c 105  like 5 but trcl=2 
106 like 6 but trcl=2 
107 like 7 but trcl=2 
108 like 8 but trcl=2 
109 like 9 but trcl=2 
110 like 10 but trcl=2 
111 like 11 but trcl=2 
118 like 18 but trcl=2 
119 like 19 but trcl=2 
121 like 21 but trcl=2 
122 like 22 but trcl=2 
113 like 13 but trcl=2 
114 like 14 but trcl=2 
123 like 23 but trcl=2 
115 like 15 but trcl=2 
116 like 16 but trcl=2 
117 like 17 but trcl=2 
c 
c   EJ-309 Detector 3 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
301 like 1 but trcl=3 
303 like 3 but trcl=3 
304 like 4 but trcl=3 
c 305  like 5 but trcl=3 
306 like 6 but trcl=3 
307 like 7 but trcl=3 
308 like 8 but trcl=3 
309 like 9 but trcl=3 
310 like 10 but trcl=3 
311 like 11 but trcl=3 
318 like 18 but trcl=3 
319 like 19 but trcl=3 
321 like 21 but trcl=3 
322 like 22 but trcl=3 
313 like 13 but trcl=3 
314 like 14 but trcl=3 
323 like 23 but trcl=3 
315 like 15 but trcl=3 
316 like 16 but trcl=3 
317 like 17 but trcl=3 
c 
c   EJ-309 Detector 4 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
401 like 1 but trcl=4 
403 like 3 but trcl=4 
404 like 4 but trcl=4 
c 405  like 5 but trcl=4 
406 like 6 but trcl=4 
407 like 7 but trcl=4 
408 like 8 but trcl=4 
409 like 9 but trcl=4 
410 like 10 but trcl=4 
411 like 11 but trcl=4 
418 like 18 but trcl=4 
419 like 19 but trcl=4 
421 like 21 but trcl=4 
422 like 22 but trcl=4 
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413 like 13 but trcl=4 
414 like 14 but trcl=4 
423 like 23 but trcl=4 
415 like 15 but trcl=4 
416 like 16 but trcl=4 
417 like 17 but trcl=4 
c 
c   Lead Bricks 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
500  9  -11.34 (40 :-41 )-42 43 (-44 :45 )-46 47 48 -49   imp:n,p=1 
501 like 500 but trcl=2 
502 like 500 but trcl=3 
503 like 500 but trcl=4 
c 
c   Table 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
200  2  -2.7  -50  imp:n,p=1     $ Surface 
201  2  -2.7  -51  imp:n,p=1     $ Surface 
202  2  -2.7  -52  imp:n,p=1     $ Surface 
203  2  -2.7  -53  imp:n,p=1     $ Support 
204  2  -2.7  -54  imp:n,p=1     $ Support 
205  2  -2.7  -55  imp:n,p=1     $ Support 
206  2  -2.7  -56  imp:n,p=1     $ Support 
207  2  -2.7  -57  imp:n,p=1     $ Support 
208  2  -2.7  -58  imp:n,p=1     $ Support 
209  2  -2.7  -59  imp:n,p=1     $ Support 
210  2  -2.7  -60  imp:n,p=1     $ Support 
211  2  -2.7  -61  imp:n,p=1     $ Support 
213  2  -2.7  -62  imp:n,p=1     $ Support 
214  2  -2.7  -63  imp:n,p=1     $ Leg 
215  2  -2.7  -64  imp:n,p=1     $ Leg  
216  2  -2.7  -65  imp:n,p=1     $ Leg  
217  2  -2.7  -66  imp:n,p=1     $ Leg 
218  2  -2.7  -67  imp:n,p=1     $ Leg 
219  2  -2.7  -68  imp:n,p=1     $ Leg  
220  2  -2.7  -69  imp:n,p=1     $ Leg  
221  2  -2.7  -70  imp:n,p=1     $ Leg 
c 
c   Floor 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 




990 4  -.001225   -99  
     50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62   $ Table 
     63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70  97    imp:n,p=1 
      $ 76 -84 89 (77:-89:86)      imp:n,p=1  $ Floor 
991 4 -0.001225   -98      
     #1 #3 #4 #6 #7 #8 #9 #10 #11 #18 #19 #13 $ Det 1  
     #14 #15 #16 #17 #21 #22 #23 
     #101 #103 #104 #106 #107 #108 #109 #110  $ Det 2  
     #111 #118 #119 #113 #114 #115 #116 #117  
     #121 #122 #123 
     #301 #303 #304 #306 #307 #308 #309 #310  $ Det 3  
     #311 #318 #319 #313 #314 #315 #316 #317  
     #321 #322 #323 
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     #401 #403 #404 #406 #407 #408 #409 #410  $ Det 4  
     #411 #418 #419 #413 #414 #415 #416 #417  
     #421 #422 #423 #500 #501 #502 #503  
     (-89:76:84) (77:-84:86) #613   imp:n,p=1    $ Lead Bricks   








c   MOX Source Container 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~     
71    6    cz 2.1  $Support cylinder inner 
72    6    cz 5.1  $Support cylinder outer and upper empty space 
73    6    cz 4.14  $inner contaner cylinder inner wall 
74    6    cz 4.445  $inner container cylinder outer wall 
75    6    cz 5.2  $outer container cylinder inner wall 
76    6    cz 5.4  $outer container cylinder outer wall 
77    6    cz 6.75  $top steel cylinder    
c  78    6    pz -17.5482  $top of support, bottom of container 
79    6    pz -16.5482  $outer container - BOTTOM 
80    6    pz -16.3482  $inner container outer surf 
81    6    pz -15.8482  $inner container inner surf 
82    6    pz 10.9518  $inner container inner surf 
83    6    pz 11.4518  $inner container outer surf 
84    6    pz 11.6518  $outer container 
85    6    pz 13.6518  $outer container 
86    6    pz 15.6518  $outer container 
87    6    pz 10.9517  $top of PuO powder 
88    6    pz -17.5 
89    6    pz -17.5482   $ top 
c 
c   EJ-309 Detector 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
C      Surface cards for detector 
1  1    PX   0 
2  1    PX   0.16002 
3  1    PX   11.8 
4  1    PX   12.6 
32 1    PX   12.67 
5  1    PX   13.35 
c 7  1    CX   5.2303 
8  1    CX   6.33998 
9  1    CX   6.5 
10 1    CX   6.35 
C      Surface cards for the PMT 
11 1    CX   6.8984 
12 1    CX   7 
13 1    CX   8.2 
14 1    PX   14.6 
31 1    PX   21.95 
15 1    PX   32.2 
16 1    PX   34.7 
27 1    PX   35.4 
17 1    PX   37.63998 
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18 1    PX   37.8 
34 1    CX   4.2 
19 1    CX   4.3984 
20 1    CX   4.5 
35 1    CX   4.7 
21 1    PX   29.3 
C      Surface cards for the table 
22 1    PY  -8.54238 
23 1    PY  -8.29438 
24 1    PX  -95.6 
25 1    PZ  -38.1 
26 1    PZ   38.1 
33 1    PX   56.8 
C      Surface cards for the conical part of the PMT 
c 27 1    CX    
28 1    KX   37.3  0.743162901 -1 
29 1    KX   37.42 0.743162901 -1 
c 
c   Lead Blocks 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
40 5 P -55.125 0 56.25 275.625 
41 5 P -55.125 0 -56.25 0 
42 5 PX 0 
43 5 PX -5 
44 5 P 27.5625 -28.125 0 175.594 
45 5 P 27.5625 28.125 0 -316.41 
46 5 P -55.125 0 56.25 1403.438 
47 5 p -55.125 0 -56.25 -1127.81 
48 5 P 27.5625 -28.125 0 -454.22 
49 5 P 27.5625 28.125 0 316.406 
c  
c   Table 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
50 BOX -100 -50 -0.5    50 0 0    0 100 0   0 0 0.5     $ Surface     
51 BOX -50 -100 -0.5    100 0 0   0 200 0   0 0 0.5     $ Surface 
52 BOX  50 -50  -0.5    50 0 0    0 100 0   0 0 0.5     $ Surface 
53 BOX -100 -50 -4.9    50 0 0    0 4.4 0   0 0 4.4     $ Support 
54 BOX -100 -45.6 -4.9  4.4 0 0   0 91.2 0  0 0 4.4     $ Support 
55 BOX -100 45.6 -4.9   50 0 0    0 4.4 0   0 0 4.4     $ Support  
56 BOX -50 -100 -4.9    4.4 0 0   0 200 0   0 0 4.4     $ Support 
57 BOX 45.6 -100 -4.9   4.4 0 0   0 200 0   0 0 4.4     $ Support 
58 BOX -45.6 -100 -4.9  91.2 0 0  0 4.4 0   0 0 4.4     $ Support 
59 BOX -45.6 95.6 -4.9  91.2 0 0  0 4.4 0   0 0 4.4     $ Support 
60 BOX 50 -50 -4.9      50 0 0    0 4.4 0   0 0 4.4     $ Support 
61 BOX 50 45.6 -4.9     50 0 0    0 4.4 0   0 0 4.4     $ Support 
62 BOX 95.6 -45.6 -4.9  4.4 0 0   0 91.2 0  0 0 4.4     $ Support 
63 BOX -100 -2.2 -4.9   4.4 0 0   0 4.4 0   0 0 -85.5   $ Leg 
64 BOX -50 -2.2 -4.9    4.4 0 0   0 4.4 0   0 0 -85.5   $ Leg 
65 BOX 45.6 -2.2 -4.9   4.4 0 0   0 4.4 0   0 0 -85.5   $ Leg 
66 BOX 95.6 -2.2 -4.9   4.4 0 0   0 4.4 0   0 0 -85.5   $ Leg 
67 BOX -50 -100 -4.9    4.4 0 0   0 4.4 0   0 0 -85.5   $ Leg 
68 BOX 45.6 -100 -4.9   4.4 0 0   0 4.4 0   0 0 -85.5   $ Leg 
69 BOX -50 95.6 -4.9    4.4 0 0   0 4.4 0   0 0 -85.5   $ Leg 
70 BOX 45.6 95.6 -4.9   4.4 0 0   0 4.4 0   0 0 -85.5   $ Leg 
c 




97 BOX -300 -300 -120.9 600 0 0  0 600 0  0 0 30.5 
c 
c   Enviroment 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
98 BOX -350 -350  0     700 0 0   0 700 0   0 0 150 




c   DATA  
c 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
TR1 30 0 13                           $ Move the Detectors 
TR2 0 0 0   -1 0 0   0 1 0   0 0 1 
TR3 0 0 0   0 -1 0   1 0 0   0 0 1 
TR4 0 0 0   0 1 0   -1 0 0   0 0 1 
TR5 30 0 0                            $ Move the Lead 
TR6 0 0 17.5484                       $ Move the MOX 
c 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 




PHYS:N J 20. 
PHYS:P 0 1 1 
CUT:P 2J 0 
c 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c   SOURCE 
c 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
sdef pos=0 0 0 axs=0 0 1 rad=d1 ext=d2 TR=6 erg=d3 
sc1  Source radius (inner outer) 
si1  0 4.14 
sp1  -21 1 
sc2  source height 
si2  -15.8482 7.9228  
sp2  -21 0 
si3  L 3 4 38 39 40 41 
sp3  0.3736 0.0455 0.0682 0.0902 0.1404 0.2822 
IPOL 99 1 2 1 J 1 4 6 106 306 406 
NPS 33656840 $ 52337 rxn/s, 14 hr meas is 3029115600 rxn/s, 90 seeds 
FILES 21 DUMN1 
DBCN 
PRDMP 2J 1 
c 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 




c   MOX 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 





~m1    8016.60c -0.16443  94238.42c -0.00024   94239.60c -0.11062 
      94240.60c -0.04650  94241.60c -0.000183  94242.60c -0.00334 
      95241.61c -0.00490  92235.60c -0.00474   92238.60c -0.66330 
c  
c   Aluminium  p=-2.7 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
m2   13027.70c -0.9653 
     12000.60c -0.0100 
     26000.55c -0.0070 
     14000.60c -0.0060 
     29000.50c -0.0028 
     30000.42c -0.0025 
     24000.50c -0.0020 
     25055.70c -0.0015 
     22000.51c -0.0015 
c 
c    concrete (ordinary with ENDF-VI)  ,d=-2.35       ,PRS 374 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
m3    1001.60c -0.005558    8016.60c -0.498076    11023.60c -0.017101    
      12000.60c -0.002565   13027.60c -0.045746   14000.60c -0.315092 
      16000.60c -0.001283   19000.60c -0.019239   20000.60c -0.082941  
      26054.60c -0.000707   26056.60c -0.011390   26057.60c -0.000265 
      26058.60c -0.000036 
c 
c    air (US S. Atm at sea level) d=-.001225    ,HC&P 14-19 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
m4   7014.60c -0.755636    8016.60c -0.231475   18000.59c -0.012889   
c 
c    EJ-309 liquid scintillator d=-0.916 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
m5     1001      0.548          nlib = 60c 
       6000      0.452          nlib = 60c  
c 
c    Nitrogen    d=-0.001 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c m6      7014  1                 nlib = 60c 
c 
c    Pyrex    d=-2.23 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
m7      5011  -0.040064         nlib = 60c 
        8016  -0.539562         nlib = 60c 
       11023  -0.028191         nlib = 60c 
       13027  -0.011644         nlib = 60c 
       14000  -0.377220         nlib = 60c 
       19000  -0.003321         nlib = 60c  
c 
c    MU-Metal   d=-8.747 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
m8     28000.50c 0.8               
       42000     0.05           nlib = 60c 
       14000     0.005          nlib = 60c 
       29063     0.0002         nlib = 60c 
       26056     0.1448         nlib = 60c  
c 




m9   82000.50c 1  
c    Steel 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
m10   26000.55c -0.6950 
     24000.50c -0.1900 
     28000.50c -0.0950 








c   Face of Detector 1 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
F11:n 2 
E11 0.640 100 
C11 0 1 
FS11 -9 
F21:p 2 
E21 0 99i 10 
C21 0 1 
FS21 -9 
c 
c   Face of Detector 2 
c ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
F31:n 101002 
E31 0.640 100 
C31 0 1 
FS31 -9 
F41:p 2 
E41 0 99i 10 






INL Mixed-Oxide Fuel Example 
Sample 127 Aged -- 90 pins -- 40 cm -- 2 in Pb shielding 
c CELL CARDS 
c MOX Fuel Can 
  4    2  -2.7    -71 72          IMP:N,P=1 
c MOX Fuel Rods 
  5    3  -9.45068   -82          IMP:N,P=1   $ fuel core 
  6    4  -6.5    -81 82          IMP:N,P=1   $ fuel cladding 
  7    LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=1 
  8    LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=2 
  9    LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=3 
  10   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=4 
  11   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=5 
  12   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=6 
  13   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=7 
  14   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=8 
  15   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=9 
  16   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=10 
  17   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=11 
  18   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=12 
  19   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=13 
  20   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=14 
  21   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=15 
  22   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=16 
  23   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=17 
  24   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=18 
  25   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=19 
  26   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=20 
  27   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=21 
  28   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=22 
  29   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=23 
  30   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=24 
  31   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=25 
  32   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=26 
  33   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=27 
  34   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=28 
  35   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=29 
  36   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=30 
  37   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=31 
  38   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=32 
  39   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=33 
  40   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=34 
  41   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=35 
  42   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=36 
  43   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=37 
  44   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=38 
  45   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=39 
  46   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=40 
  47   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=41 
  48   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=42 
  49   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=43 
  50   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=44 
  51   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=45 
  52   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=46 
  53   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=47 
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  54   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=48 
  55   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=49 
  56   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=50 
  57   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=51 
  58   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=52 
  59   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=53 
  60   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=54 
  61   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=55 
  62   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=56 
  63   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=57 
  64   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=58 
  65   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=59 
  66   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=60 
  67   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=61 
  68   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=62 
  69   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=63 
  70   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=64 
  71   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=65 
  72   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=66 
  73   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=67 
  74   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=68 
  75   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=69 
  76   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=70 
  77   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=71 
  78   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=72 
  79   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=73 
  80   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=74 
  81   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=75 
  82   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=76 
  83   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=77 
  84   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=78 
  85   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=79 
  86   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=80 
  87   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=81 
  88   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=82 
  89   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=83 
  90   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=84 
  91   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=85 
  92   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=86 
  93   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=87 
  94   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=88 
  95   LIKE 5 BUT TRCL=89 
  106  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=1 
  107  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=2 
  108  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=3 
  109  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=4 
  110  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=5 
  111  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=6 
  112  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=7 
  113  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=8 
  114  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=9 
  115  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=10 
  116  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=11 
  117  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=12 
  118  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=13 
  119  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=14 
  120  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=15 
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  121  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=16 
  122  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=17 
  123  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=18 
  124  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=19 
  125  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=20 
  126  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=21 
  127  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=22 
  128  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=23 
  129  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=24 
  130  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=25 
  131  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=26 
  132  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=27 
  133  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=28 
  134  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=29 
  135  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=30 
  136  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=31 
  137  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=32 
  138  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=33 
  139  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=34 
  140  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=35 
  141  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=36 
  142  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=37 
  143  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=38 
  144  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=39 
  145  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=40 
  146  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=41 
  147  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=42 
  148  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=43 
  149  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=44 
  150  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=45 
  151  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=46 
  152  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=47 
  153  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=48 
  154  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=49 
  155  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=50 
  156  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=51 
  157  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=52 
  158  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=53 
  159  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=54 
  160  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=55 
  161  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=56 
  162  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=57 
  163  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=58 
  164  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=59 
  165  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=60 
  166  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=61 
  167  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=62 
  168  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=63 
  169  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=64 
  170  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=65 
  171  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=66 
  172  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=67 
  173  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=68 
  174  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=69 
  175  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=70 
  176  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=71 
  177  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=72 
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  178  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=73 
  179  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=74 
  180  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=75 
  181  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=76 
  182  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=77 
  183  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=78 
  184  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=79 
  185  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=80 
  186  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=81 
  187  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=82 
  188  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=83 
  189  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=84 
  190  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=85 
  191  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=86 
  192  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=87 
  193  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=88 
  194  LIKE 6 BUT TRCL=89 
c Air inside MOX fuel can  (within the inner three rings of pins) 
  201  5 -0.001205  -74      #5   #6   #7   #8   #9  #10  #11   
                            #12 #106 #107 #108 #109 #110 #111 
             #13  #14  #15  #16  #17  #18  #19  #20  #21  #22 
             #23  #24  #25  #26  #27  #28  #29  #30  #31  #32 
             #33  #34  #35  #36  #37  #38  #39  #40  #41  #42 
            #112 #113 #114 #115 #116 #117 #118 #119 #120 #121 
            #122 #123 #124 #125 #126 #127 #128 #129 #130 #131 
            #132 #133 #134 #135 #136 #137 #138 #139 #140 #141 IMP:N,P=1 
c Air inside MOX fuel can  (within the second to last ring of pins) 
  203  5 -0.001205  -73 74  #43  #44  #45  #46  #47  #48  #49 
             #50  #51  #52  #53  #54  #55  #56  #57  #58  #59   
             #60  #61  #62  #63  #64  #65  #66 #142 #143 #144  
            #145 #146 #147 #148 #149 #150 #151 #152 #153 #154 
            #155 #156 #157 #158 #159 #160 #161 #162 #163 #164 
            #165                                              IMP:N,P=1 
c Air inside MOX fuel can  (within the outer ring of pins) 
  204  5 -0.001205  -72 73  #67  #68  #69  #70  #71  #72  #73 
             #74  #75  #76  #77  #78  #79  #80  #81  #82  #83 
             #84  #85  #86  #87  #88  #89  #90  #91  #92  #93 
             #94  #95 #166 #167 #168 #169 #170 #171 #172 #173 
            #174 #175 #176 #177 #178 #179 #180 #181 #182 #183 
            #184 #185 #186 #187 #188 #189 #190 #191 #192 #193  
            #194                                              IMP:N,P=1 
c Detector active liquid volumes (EJ-309) 
  301  1   -0.964  -31    IMP:N,P=1 
  302  1   -0.964  -32    IMP:N,P=1 
  303  1   -0.964  -33    IMP:N,P=1 
  304  1   -0.964  -34    IMP:N,P=1 
c Shielding (lead) 
  401  6   -11.34  -41    IMP:N,P=1 
  402  6   -11.34  -42    IMP:N,P=1 
  403  6   -11.34  -43    IMP:N,P=1 
  404  6   -11.34  -44    IMP:N,P=1 
  405  6   -11.34  -45    IMP:N,P=1 
  406  6   -11.34  -46    IMP:N,P=1 
  407  6   -11.34  -47    IMP:N,P=1 
  408  6   -11.34  -48    IMP:N,P=1 
c Table (plywood) 
  501  7   -0.4785 -51    IMP:N,P=1 
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  502  7   -0.4785 -52    IMP:N,P=1 
  503  7   -0.4785 -53    IMP:N,P=1 
  504  7   -0.4785 -54    IMP:N,P=1 
c Source stand (styrofoam) 
  601  8   -0.016  -61    IMP:N,P=1 
c Bounding sphere 
  999  5 -1.205E-3 -99 31 32 33 34 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 
                       51 52 53 54 61 71 IMP:N,P=1 
c Outside universe  
  9999 0            99      IMP:N,P=0 
c END CELL CARDS-BLANK LINE FOLLOWS 
 
c SURFACE CARDS 
c Detector active volumes (det 1,2,3,5) 
  31   RCC   40   0     0   12.7   0     0  6.35  
  32   RCC  -40   0     0  -12.7   0     0  6.35 
  33   RCC   0    0   -40    0     0 -12.7  6.35 
  34   RCC   0    0    40    0     0  12.7  6.35 
c Shielding blocks 
  41   RPP    34.42  39.50  -10.16  10.16  -10.16  10.16 
  42   RPP   -39.50 -34.42  -10.16  10.16  -10.16  10.16 
  43   RPP   -10.16  10.16  -10.16  10.16  -39.50 -34.42 
  44   RPP   -10.16  10.16  -10.16  10.16   34.42  39.50 
  45   RPP    29.34  39.50  -15.24 -10.16  -10.16  10.16 
  46   RPP   -39.50 -29.34  -15.24 -10.16  -10.16  10.16 
  47   RPP   -10.16  10.16  -15.24 -10.16  -39.50 -29.34 
  48   RPP   -10.16  10.16  -15.24 -10.16   29.34  39.50 
c Table 
  51   RPP      0.00  152.40   -15.875  -15.24    -43.18   43.18 
  52   RPP   -152.40    0.00   -15.875  -15.24    -43.18   43.18 
  53   RPP    -43.18   43.18   -15.875  -15.24   -195.58  -43.18 
  54   RPP    -43.18   43.18   -15.875  -15.24     43.18  195.58 
c Source stand 
  61   RPP     -7.62  7.62  -15.24 -7.77875  -7.62  7.62    
c Can containing fuel rods (1/16in thick) 
  71   RCC     0 -7.77875 0   0 17.78   0   5.56 
  72   RCC     0 -7.62    0   0 17.4625 0   5.40 
  73   RCC     0 -7.62    0   0 17.4625 0   4.23 
  74   RCC     0 -7.62    0   0 17.4625 0   3.26626 
c MOX Fuel Rods 
  81   RCC  0  -7.62     0    0  15.24   0   0.47624 
  82   RCC  0  -7.58952  0    0  15.179  0   0.424577 
c Bounding sphere 
  99   SO 250 
c END SURFACE CARDS-BLANK LINE FOLLOWS 
 




TR1     0.9525 0.00000        0 
TR2    0.47625 0.00000 0.824889 
TR3    -0.9525 0.00000        0 
TR4   -0.47625 0.00000 0.824889 
TR5    0.47625 0.00000 -0.82489 
TR6   -0.47625 0.00000 -0.82489 
TR7   1.786963 0.00000 0.478815 
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TR8   1.308148 0.00000 1.308148 
TR9   0.478815 0.00000 1.786963 
TR10  -1.78696 0.00000 0.478815 
TR11  -1.30815 0.00000 1.308148 
TR12  -0.47882 0.00000 1.786963 
TR13  1.786963 0.00000 -0.47882 
TR14  1.308148 0.00000 -1.30815 
TR15  0.478815 0.00000 -1.78696 
TR16  -1.78696 0.00000 -0.47882 
TR17  -1.30815 0.00000 -1.30815 
TR18  -0.47882 0.00000 -1.78696 
TR19      2.79 0.00000        0 
TR20  2.621742 0.00000 0.954236 
TR21  2.137264 0.00000 1.793377 
TR22     1.395 0.00000 2.416211 
TR23  0.484478 0.00000 2.747614 
TR24     -2.79 0.00000        0 
TR25  -2.62174 0.00000 0.954236 
TR26  -2.13726 0.00000 1.793377 
TR27    -1.395 0.00000 2.416211 
TR28  -0.48448 0.00000 2.747614 
TR29  2.621742 0.00000 -0.95424 
TR30  2.137264 0.00000 -1.79338 
TR31     1.395 0.00000 -2.41621 
TR32  0.484478 0.00000 -2.74761 
TR33  -2.62174 0.00000 -0.95424 
TR34  -2.13726 0.00000 -1.79338 
TR35    -1.395 0.00000 -2.41621 
TR36  -0.48448 0.00000 -2.74761 
TR37   3.71792 0.00000  0.48947 
TR38   3.46455 0.00000  1.43506 
TR39   2.97508 0.00000  2.28286 
TR40   2.28286 0.00000  2.97508 
TR41   1.43506 0.00000  3.46455 
TR42   0.48947 0.00000  3.71792 
TR43  -3.71792 0.00000  0.48947 
TR44  -3.46455 0.00000  1.43506 
TR45  -2.97508 0.00000  2.28286 
TR46  -2.28286 0.00000  2.97508 
TR47  -1.43506 0.00000  3.46455 
TR48  -0.48947 0.00000  3.71792 
TR49   3.71792 0.00000 -0.48947 
TR50   3.46455 0.00000 -1.43506 
TR51   2.97508 0.00000 -2.28286 
TR52   2.28286 0.00000 -2.97508 
TR53   1.43506 0.00000 -3.46455 
TR54   0.48947 0.00000 -3.71792 
TR55  -3.71792 0.00000 -0.48947 
TR56  -3.46455 0.00000 -1.43506 
TR57  -2.97508 0.00000 -2.28286 
TR58  -2.28286 0.00000 -2.97508 
TR59  -1.43506 0.00000 -3.46455 
TR60  -0.48947 0.00000 -3.71792 
TR61   4.71000 0.00000  0.00000 
TR62   4.60708 0.00000  0.97926 
TR63   4.30280 0.00000  1.91573 
TR64   3.81047 0.00000  2.76847 
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TR65   3.15161 0.00000  3.50021 
TR66   2.35500 0.00000  4.07898 
TR67   1.45547 0.00000  4.47948 
TR68   0.49233 0.00000  4.68420 
TR69  -4.71000 0.00000  0.00000 
TR70  -4.60708 0.00000  0.97926 
TR71  -4.30280 0.00000  1.91573 
TR72  -3.81047 0.00000  2.76847 
TR73  -3.15161 0.00000  3.50021 
TR74  -2.35500 0.00000  4.07898 
TR75  -1.45547 0.00000  4.47948 
TR76   4.60708 0.00000 -0.97926 
TR77   4.30280 0.00000 -1.91573 
TR78   3.81047 0.00000 -2.76847 
TR79   3.15161 0.00000 -3.50021 
TR80   2.35500 0.00000 -4.07898 
TR81   1.45547 0.00000 -4.47948 
TR82   0.49233 0.00000 -4.68420 
TR83  -4.60708 0.00000 -0.97926 
TR84  -4.30280 0.00000 -1.91573 
TR85  -3.81047 0.00000 -2.76847 
TR86  -3.15161 0.00000 -3.50021 
TR87  -2.35500 0.00000 -4.07898 
TR88  -1.45547 0.00000 -4.47948 




  MODE   N 
  NPS    1.25E8 
  SDEF   ERG=D1 CEL=D2 POS=0 0 0 AXS=0 1 0 RAD=D3 EXT=D4 EFF=1e-4 
  SI1 L  3      4      38     39     40     41 
  SP1    0.3624 0.0090 0.0583 0.2183 0.1082 0.2439 
  SI2 L  5    7  87I  95 
  SP2    0.01111    89R 
  SI3    0       5.4 
  SI4   -7.62    7.62 




  IPOL     99 1 2 1 J 1 4 301 302 303 304       $Mixed source 
  RDUM     0.001 0.001 
  FILES    21 DUMN1 
  DBCN 
  PRDMP 2J 1 
c Analog physics   
  PHYS:N   J 20 
  PHYS:P   0 1 1 
  CUT:N    2J 0 
  CUT:P    2J 0 
  PRINT    10 40 50 110 126 140 
c MATERIALS SPECIFICATION   
c Liquid scintillator EJ-309 
  M1  PLIB=02p  NLIB=60c 
     1001  0.5554 




  M2  PLIB=02p  NLIB=60c 
     13027  1.0 
c Aged Pu-O fuel core 
  M3  PLIB=02p  NLIB=60c 
     92235 -0.00168 92238 -0.74774 92234     -0.00002 
     93237 -0.00002 94238 -0.00009 94239     -0.11416 94240     -
0.01528 
     94241 -0.00049 94242 -0.00022 95241.04p -0.00181 08016     -
0.11846 
c Fuel pin cladding 
  M4  PLIB=02p  NLIB=60c 
     26056 -0.695319   24052 -0.185391   28058 -0.096529 
     25055 -0.012833   14000 -0.004681   27059 -0.000888 
     42000 -0.000565   29063 -0.000565   22000 -0.000484 
     13027 -0.000323    6000 -0.000242   73181 -0.000161 
     15031 -0.000161    4009 -0.000081   16000 -0.000081 
c Air 
  M5  PLIB=02p  NLIB=60c 
      7014 -0.755000    8016 -0.232000   18000.42c -0.013000 
c Lead 
  M6  PLIB=02p  NLIB=60c 
      82208 1 
c Plywood 
  M7  PLIB=02p  NLIB=60c 
      14000 0.3289  15031 0.0899  16000 0.0949 
      17000 0.0112  19000 0.1044  20000 0.3015 
      24052 0.0037  22000 0.0025  25055 0.0581 
      26056 0.0049 
c Styrofoam 
  M8  PLIB=02p  NLIB=60c 
      1001 1 6000 1 
c TALLY SPECIFICATION 
  FC11 Neutron fluence crossing the detector faces 
  F11:N  31.3 
  E11    0 999i 10 19i 20 100 
  C11    0 1 
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